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dergone a significant transformation. Firms that commit crimes are no longer 
simply required to pay fines. Instead, prosecutors and firms enter into pretrial di-
version agreements (PDAs). Prosecutors regularly use PDAs to impose mandates 
on firms, creating new duties that alter firms’ internal operations or governance 
structures. DOJ policy favors the use of such mandates for any firm with a defi-
cient compliance program at the time of the crime. This Article evaluates PDA 
mandates to determine when and how prosecutors should use them to deter corpo-
rate crime. We find that the current DOJ policy on mandates is misguided and 
that mandates should be imposed more selectively. Specifically, mandates are ap-
propriate only if a firm is plagued by policing agency costs—in that the firm’s 
managers did not act to deter or report wrongdoing because they benefited person-
ally from tolerating wrongdoing or from deficient corporate policing. Moreover, only 
mandates that are properly designed to reduce policing agency costs are appropriate. 
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The policing agency cost justification for mandates that we develop calls into ques-
tion both the extent to which mandates are used and the type of mandates that are 
imposed by prosecutors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, corporate criminal enforcement in the 
United States has undergone a dramatic transformation. Federal 
officials no longer simply fine publicly held firms that commit 
crimes. Instead, they use their enforcement authority to impose 
mandates on these firms—mandates that can require a firm to 
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alter its compliance program, governance structure, or scope of 
operations.1 
Prosecutors generally impose mandates through pretrial di-
version agreements (PDAs), specifically deferred prosecution 
agreements and nonprosecution agreements. In a PDA, the 
prosecutor agrees not to pursue a criminal conviction of a firm, 
but nevertheless typically imposes financial sanctions on the 
firm. In return, the firm usually agrees to cooperate in the in-
vestigation and admit to the facts of the crime.2 In addition, 
most PDAs contain mandates that govern the firm’s future be-
havior. These mandates impose new prosecutor-created duties 
on the firm. They may require the firm to adopt a corporate 
compliance program with specified features not otherwise re-
quired by law, to alter its internal reporting structure, to add 
specific individuals to the board of directors, to modify certain 
business practices, or to hire a prosecutor-approved corporate 
monitor.3 
Prosecutors’ use of PDAs to create and impose such man-
dates on firms with detected misconduct fundamentally alters 
both the structure of corporate criminal law and the role of the 
prosecutor.4 Under traditional duty-based corporate liability,5 
 
 1 PDA mandates can be imposed on any firm but usually are imposed on publicly 
held firms and their controlled subsidiaries, according to our data set. See also Cindy R. 
Alexander and Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settlements: An 
Empirical Perspective on Non-prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea Agreements, 52 
Am Crim L Rev 537, 569, 589–90 (2015) (finding that 91 of the 157 PDAs with public 
companies or their controlled subsidiaries from 1997 to 2011 included compliance  
mandates). 
 2 Lawrence D. Finder, Ryan D. McConnell, and Scott L. Mitchell, Betting the Cor-
poration: Compliance or Defiance? Compliance Programs in the Context of Deferred and 
Non-prosecution Agreements: Corporate Pre-trial Agreement Update–2008, 28 Corp 
Counsel Rev 1, 4–5 (2009). 
 3 See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 Va L Rev 853, 897–99 
(2007); Peter Spivack and Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends 
in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 Am Crim L Rev 159, 184–87 (2008); Finder, 
McConnell, and Mitchell, 28 Corp Counsel Rev at 4–5, 22–30 (cited in note 2). See also 
Vikramaditya Khanna and Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Cor-
porate Czar?, 105 Mich L Rev 1713, 1720–26 (2007) (discussing corporate-monitor provi-
sions in PDAs). 
 4 Prosecutors can impose mandates on firms through PDAs or guilty pleas. The 
conclusions we reach regarding the appropriate purposes and forms of PDA mandates 
apply as well to mandates imposed through corporate guilty pleas. 
 5 We use the term “traditional corporate liability” to refer to corporate liability re-
gimes that rely on duties and sanctions created and announced ex ante, that are applied 
to all firms or all firms in a particular category, and that are enforced through monetary 
sanctions. Strict respondeat superior, corporate liability with mitigation of fines gov-
erned by the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, and enforcement policies that offer 
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corporations are effectively subject to duties to adopt an effective 
compliance program, self-report, or cooperate, duties that are 
hereinafter referred to as “policing duties.”6 These policing du-
ties are imposed ex ante on all firms (or all firms in a particular 
category). Traditional criminal liability enforces these duties 
through “harm-contingent” sanctions: firms are sanctioned for 
breaching any policing duties only if a substantive criminal vio-
lation occurred.7 
PDA mandates deviate from this traditional regime in two 
ways. First, they impose policing duties ex post on select firms 
with detected wrongdoing, rather than ex ante on all firms. In-
deed, not only are the mandated duties imposed after a substan-
tive violation occurs, but the content of the mandates is often de-
termined only at that time. Thus, a firm does not know 
beforehand what additional duties it could become subject to 
should it commit a substantive violation. Second, liability for vi-
olating PDA mandates is not harm contingent. That is, a mere 
violation of the firm’s ex post policing mandate, without the 
commission of a further substantive violation, exposes the firm 
 
full or partial leniency to firms that self-report are all examples of traditional corporate 
liability rules. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 8 (2015) 
(“Organizational Sentencing Guidelines”). 
 6 Policing measures are measures that increase the probability that a crime is de-
tected or sanctioned. See Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate 
Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 NYU L Rev 687, 693 (1997). 
Effective compliance programs, self-reporting, and cooperation with federal authorities 
are all policing measures. See id at 706–07. By contrast, “prevention measures” deter by 
reducing employees’ incentives to commit a crime. Id at 693. 
Although the law does not technically require all firms to adopt an effective compli-
ance program and self-report, the existing regime can be characterized as imposing du-
ties to adopt an effective compliance program, self-report, and cooperate, enforced by 
harm-contingent sanctions, in that firms that fail to take these actions face higher sanc-
tions under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines for detected wrongdoing than do 
those that do undertake them. See Organizational Sentencing Guidelines § 8C2.5(f)–(g) 
(cited in note 5). In addition, federal enforcement authorities focus on effective compli-
ance, self-reporting, and cooperation in deciding whether to indict a firm or to impose a 
PDA. See US Attorney’s Manual, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organi-
zations § 9-28.900 (“USAM”), in The Department of Justice Manual (Wolters Kluwer 3d 
ed 2016); Andrew Weissmann, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act En-
forcement Plan and Guidance *4 (DOJ, Criminal Division, Apr 5, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/PV39-EFZ4 (“FCPA Pilot Program”) (indicating the importance of self-
reporting in obtaining either a PDA or a declination). See also Part II.A. 
 7 Daniel M. Mandil, Note, Chance, Freedom, and Criminal Liability, 87 Colum L 
Rev 125, 136–38 (1987). Throughout this Article we use the terms “substantive crime,” 
“substantive violation,” “substantive wrongdoing,” and “harm” to refer to any wrongdo-
ing—for example, securities fraud—except for wrongdoing that takes the form of failing 
to undertake corporate policing intended to deter and detect substantive violations—for 
example, a failure to have an independent audit. 
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to liability. In combination, these two features of PDA mandates 
transform prosecutors into firm-specific quasi regulators. Prose-
cutors can impose specific duties on a subset of firms with al-
leged wrongdoing, and they enforce compliance with these duties 
through sanctions for a mere failure to comply with the duties, 
even if no substantive crime occurs. 
DOJ policy and federal practice encourage prosecutors to 
impose PDA mandates on any firm with detected wrongdoing 
that did not have an effective compliance program at the time of 
the crime. The DOJ, however, has not adopted genuine stand-
ards governing what mandates to impose.8 Calls abound for fed-
eral authorities to provide adequate guidance to prosecutors on 
when to impose PDA mandates and what form they should 
take.9 Yet, in order to provide such guidance, one must first ad-
dress two fundamental questions. First, when, if ever, are man-
dates justified as a supplement to traditional corporate criminal 
liability that imposes monetary sanctions? Second, which types 
of mandates plausibly enhance social welfare? To date, neither 
the DOJ nor academic commentators have provided a satisfactory 
analysis of these issues. This Article seeks to fill this void. 
In this Article, we analyze whether, and when, the imposi-
tion of compliance programs and other mandates through PDAs 
is an efficient component of the overall liability regime. Our 
principal conclusion is that mandates should be employed far 
more selectively than is called for by current federal policy and 
practice. In particular, prosecutors should impose mandates only 
 
 8 See Garrett, 93 Va L Rev at 893 (cited in note 3) (“[N]o DOJ guidelines define 
what remedies prosecutors should seek when they negotiate structural reform agree-
ments.”); Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Im-
posed through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J Legal Analysis 191, 221 (2016). By 
contrast, the DOJ has issued guidance on a variety of other issues relating to corporate 
prosecutions, including (1) whether to impose extraordinary restitution, (2) when to seek 
a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, and (3) whether to impose a corporate monitor. 
USAM §§ 9-16.325, 9-28.1000, 9-28.710, 9-28.1500 (cited in note 6). 
 9 See, for example, Arlen, 8 J Legal Analysis at 229–30 (cited in note 8); Garrett, 
93 Va L Rev at 932–35 (cited in note 3); Spivack and Raman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 187–
90 (cited in note 3); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate 
Governance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 Fla L Rev 1, 5 & 
n 8 (2014); Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in Anthony S.  
Barkow and Rachel E. Barkow, eds, Prosecutors in the Boardroom: Using Criminal Law 
to Regulate Corporate Conduct 177, 189–90, 196–97 (NYU 2011). Indeed, some commen-
tators have gone beyond calls for guidance and have exhorted the DOJ to abandon PDAs 
altogether. See, for example, David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-
prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 Md L Rev 
1295, 1341–44 (2013). 
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on firms with policing deficiencies attributable to policing agency 
costs. Policing agency costs arise when the firm’s senior manag-
ers or board of directors personally benefit from either wrongdo-
ing or deficient corporate policing. In this situation, traditional 
corporate liability—with sanctions targeted at the firm—will not 
suffice to induce firms to undertake effective compliance, self-
report violations, and cooperate with authorities. By contrast, 
we find that PDA mandates can be structured in a cost-effective 
way to reduce policing agency costs and induce effective policing. 
Federal authorities can best deter crime by employees of 
publicly held firms by inducing firms to intervene, to detect and 
report wrongdoing, and to cooperate to bring the individuals re-
sponsible to justice (corporate policing).10 We begin our analysis 
by determining the most effective approach to achieving this 
goal. We find that this goal is generally best achieved by impos-
ing monetary sanctions for breach of generally applicable ex 
ante policing duties, as occurs in the traditional corporate crimi-
nal liability regime. Such duties can be enforced either by en-
hanced sanctions on firms that breached their policing duties 
and committed a substantive wrong (harm-contingent sanctions) 
or by sanctions on any firm that breaches these duties even if no 
substantive wrong occurred (non-harm-contingent sanctions). 
By contrast, PDA mandates, which are imposed ex post on 
select firms with detected wrongdoing, are neither needed nor 
desirable, except in one particular situation: when a firm’s sen-
ior managers benefit personally from deficient policing even 
though the firm would be better off with optimal policing. These 
firms are plagued by what we call “policing agency costs.” Be-
cause senior managers obtain personal benefits from deficient 
policing, the threat of sanctions imposed on the firm for deficient 
policing may not be sufficient to induce them to ensure the firm 
undertakes effective policing. 
We show that PDA mandates are a potentially effective so-
lution to this problem. Properly designed PDA mandates can 
ameliorate policing agency costs by making it more difficult or 
more costly for senior managers to have the company under-
take deficient policing. PDAs may be superior to regulation for 
 
 10 See Arlen and Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev at 692–93 (cited in note 6) (identifying 
corporate policing and prevention as the two central goals of corporate liability); Jennifer 
Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J Legal Stud 
833, 835–36 (1994) (explaining that a central goal of corporate liability is to induce firms to 
help increase the probability that the offending employees are detected and sanctioned). 
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imposing such measures because regulators cannot identify 
firms with severe policing agency costs ex ante. By contrast, 
prosecutors intervening ex post can often both identify firms 
with policing agency costs and employ information gained in the 
investigation to remedy the problem as a by-product of their 
criminal investigation.11 
We conclude by evaluating the implications of our analysis 
for existing DOJ policy and for potential reforms. First, the cur-
rent policy of encouraging prosecutors to impose PDA mandates 
whenever a firm with detected wrongdoing had a deficient com-
pliance program is not justified. Rather, such mandates should 
be imposed only if the firm suffered from substantial policing 
agency costs. 
Although identifying firms with policing agency costs inevi-
tably requires ex post firm-specific analysis of the firm’s polic-
ing, we identify three circumstances that indicate that policing 
agency costs either do not explain previous deficient policing or 
are unlikely to be present in the future: first, when a publicly 
held firm has a controlling shareholder with sufficient power 
and incentives to induce managers to act in the firm’s best in-
terest; second, when senior managers responded proactively by 
self-reporting suspected wrongdoing before any threat of disclo-
sure and by fully cooperating; and third, when the firm has un-
dergone a transformative change, such as a change in control, that 
affects the previously prevailing policing agency cost structure.12 
Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for the 
type of mandates that should be imposed. PDA mandates are 
justified only to the extent that they are effectively designed to 
reduce policing agency costs. Thus, PDAs must either impose 
precise duties falling on specific people who should expect to be 
held accountable for breach of these duties, or shift responsibil-
ity over policing to those less afflicted by agency costs, such as 
outside directors or external monitors. Mandates that are not 
designed to reduce policing agency costs, or mandates designed 
 
 11 Civil enforcement authorities, including regulators, who intervene ex post after a 
crime has occurred may also be able both to identify firms with policing agency costs and 
to determine mandates that can remedy the problem. In this Article, we examine only 
whether and when those ex post mandates that are imposed by PDAs are justified. We 
do not address mandates imposed by regulatory enforcement officials. For a discussion of 
the relative efficacy of regulators and prosecutors, see generally Miriam Hechler Baer, 
Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 BC L Rev 949 (2009). 
 12 See Part IV.A.2. 
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to improve corporate governance generally rather than policing 
agency costs specifically, are generally inappropriate. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I shows how PDA 
mandates transform corporate criminal liability. Part II exam-
ines optimal corporate liability. Part III identifies policing agency 
costs as the only situation in which PDA mandates are plausibly 
superior to properly structured traditional corporate liability. 
Part IV examines the implications of our analysis for existing 
DOJ policy and presents suggestions for reform. 
I.  CORPORATE CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AND PDAS 
This Part examines corporate criminal enforcement policy 
as applied to publicly held firms to evaluate how PDA mandates 
fit within, and alter, the corporate criminal liability regime. In 
Section A, we describe the federal corporate liability regime ap-
plied to such firms. In Section B, we review the use and typical 
terms of PDAs. In Section C, we show how PDA-imposed man-
dates fundamentally change the structure of corporate criminal 
liability. The standard regime imposes duties13 on all firms to 
undertake effective compliance and other policing measures but 
generally sanctions breach of these duties only if a substantive 
crime occurs.14 By contrast, prosecutors use PDA mandates to 
create and impose new, firm-specific policing duties ex post (af-
ter a substantive violation occurs), and to threaten firms with 
liability for breach of these duties even if no future substantive 
crime occurs. PDA mandates thus represent both a fundamental 
expansion in prosecutorial authority and a change in the liabil-
ity regime governing affected firms. 
A. US Corporate Criminal Enforcement 
In the United States, corporations can be held strictly crim-
inally liable15 for crimes committed by employees in the scope of 
 
 13 See note 6 (explaining that firms are effectively subject to ex ante duties to adopt 
effective compliance programs, self-report, and cooperate because, under federal policy, 
failure to take such actions increases both the probability of formal conviction and the 
expected sanction imposed). In addition, some statutes, such as the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, require firms to adopt an effective compliance program to detect certain 
types of misconduct. See, for example, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) 
§ 102, Pub L No 95-213, 91 Stat 1494, 1494–95, codified as amended at 15 USC 
§ 78m(b)(2). 
 14 See note 55 and accompanying text. 
 15 Corporations are “strictly” criminally liable in the sense that, in the United 
States, firms are liable for all crimes committed by employees in the scope of employment, 
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employment through the doctrine of respondeat superior.16 The 
scope of this liability is unusually broad. Corporations can be 
held criminally liable for crimes committed by low-level employ-
ees,17 contrary to corporate directives,18 or notwithstanding the 
firm’s adoption of an effective compliance program.19 Convicted 
corporations can be subject to substantial monetary sanctions, 
including fines, restitution, and remediation, as well as non-
monetary sanctions (such as corporate probation).20 They also 
may be subject to civil penalties and administrative sanctions.21 
Administrative sanctions can include delicensing and debarment 
from contracting with federal agencies (such as the Department 
of Defense, Department of Health and Human Services, or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission), which can have ruinous 
consequences for the firm.22 
 
even if the firm did all it reasonably could to prevent the crime and no member of senior 
management or the board participated in or condoned the crime. See United States v Potter, 
463 F3d 9, 25–26 (1st Cir 2010); United States v Ionia Management SA, 555 F3d 303, 
309–10 (2d Cir 2009) (per curiam); United States v Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc, 
770 F2d 399, 406–08 (4th Cir 1985). See also Charles Doyle, Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity: An Overview of Federal Law *3 (Congressional Research Service, Oct 30, 2013), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/2WH9-GLJF. 
 16 Individuals, too, are criminally liable for crimes committed with the requisite 
mens rea, even if they acted on behalf of the firm and were following instructions. See 
United States v Wise, 370 US 405, 407–08, 416 (1962). See also USAM § 9-28.210 (cited 
in note 6) (stating that prosecutors should proceed against individuals who commit cor-
porate crimes); Doyle, Corporate Criminal Liability at *5–6 (cited in note 15). 
 17 See, for example, United States v Dye Construction Co, 510 F2d 78, 80–82, 84 
(10th Cir 1975); Texas–Oklahoma Express, Inc v United States, 429 F2d 100, 101–02, 104 
(10th Cir 1970); Riss & Co v United States, 262 F2d 245, 246, 251 (8th Cir 1958); United 
States v George F. Fish, Inc, 154 F2d 798, 799–81 (2d Cir 1946). 
 18 See, for example, United States v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp, 882 F2d 656, 
660–61, 666 (2d Cir 1989); United States v Hilton Hotels Corp, 467 F2d 1000, 1004–08 
(9th Cir 1972).  
 19 See Ionia Management SA, 555 F3d at 309–10. Under the Organizational Sen-
tencing Guidelines, a corporation that had an effective compliance program, self-
reported, and cooperated is eligible for a reduced fine. Organizational Sentencing Guide-
lines § 8C2.5(f)–(g) (cited in note 5). Yet the mitigation granted to larger firms is too low 
to incentivize firms to undertake effective compliance or to self-report. Jennifer Arlen, 
The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U Miami L Rev 321, 344–51 
(2012). Moreover, convicted firms remain subject to the collateral penalties triggered by 
indictment or conviction, such as debarment, that can discourage corporate policing. See 
id at 359–60. 
 20 See Arlen, 66 U Miami L Rev at 341 n 53 (cited in note 19). 
 21 Nonfine sanctions plus civil penalties often dwarf the criminal fine. See Cindy R. 
Alexander, Jennifer Arlen, and Mark A. Cohen, Regulating Corporate Criminal Sanc-
tions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms, 42 J L & Econ 393, 410 
(1999) (providing empirical evidence). 
 22 See David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Crimi-
nal Prosecution, 49 UC Davis L Rev 1235, 1257–58 (2016); Memorandum: Bringing 
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Yet, in practice, federal prosecutors do not hold publicly 
traded corporations strictly liable for their employees’ crimes.23 
Instead, the Department of Justice instructs prosecutors to con-
sider alternatives to criminal conviction based on a variety of 
factors, including (and especially) whether the firm maintained 
an effective compliance program, self-reported, and cooperated 
in the investigation of the wrongdoing.24 Firms that fully self-
report the wrong prior to any threat of detection and cooperate 
are rarely prosecuted.25 Firms that avoid prosecution are gener-
ally subject to PDAs.26 PDAs can take one of two forms: a de-
ferred prosecution agreement (DPA) or a nonprosecution agree-
ment (NPA). Under a DPA, the prosecutor files charges but 
 
Criminal Charges against Corporations *9–10 (DOJ, June 16, 1999), archived at 
http://perma.cc/JC78-E78Y (“Holder Memo”). See also generally Baer, 50 BC L Rev 949 
(cited in note 11). 
 23 The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations apply to all 
firms. See note 6. Yet prosecutors tend to impose PDAs on firms in which control is sepa-
rated from day-to-day management, such as publicly held firms. Owner-managed firms 
tend not to receive PDAs because owner-managers are often implicated in their firms’ 
criminal activity; these firms are thus unlikely to self-report and cooperate in return for 
leniency. See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in Alon 
Harel and Keith N. Hylton, eds, Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law 
144, 152–53 (Edward Elgar 2012) (finding that substantially more publicly traded firms 
obtain PDAs than are convicted of crimes governed by the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines). Indeed, there is evidence that prosecutors are particularly inclined to use 
PDAs to sanction parent corporations. Data collected by Cindy Alexander and Professor 
Mark Cohen show that, from 2007 through 2011, 58 percent of criminal settlement 
agreements with parent corporations were PDAs, while 70 percent of settlement agree-
ments with subsidiaries were guilty pleas. See Alexander and Cohen, 52 Am Crim L Rev 
at 580–81 (cited in note 1). 
 24 USAM § 9-28.300 (cited in note 6). Then–Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder 
issued the first guidelines to federal prosecutors in 1999. The Holder Memo detailed fac-
tors prosecutors should consider in deciding whether to indict a firm. See generally 
Holder Memo (cited in note 22). The current guidelines, which build on the Holder 
Memo, are contained in the Principles. See USAM § 9-28.300 (cited in note 6). 
 25 See Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability at 152 (cited in note 23). Firms also can 
avoid conviction under other circumstances, including when the firm would be subject to 
ruinous collateral penalties and agrees to fully cooperate. See USAM §§ 9-28.300, 9-
28.900 (cited in note 6). See also Corporate Crime: Preliminary Observations on DOJ’s 
Use and Oversight of Deferred Prosecution and Non-prosecution Agreements *7–9 (GAO, 
June 25, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/F32W-Z69V (“GAO Report”). 
 26 In some cases, the DOJ will formally decline to pursue a firm instead of imposing 
a PDA. See Beverley Earle and Anita Cava, The Mystery of Declinations under the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act: A Proposal to Incentivize Compliance, 49 UC Davis L Rev 
567, 602–03 (2015) (providing an example of a declination letter sent to Allianz’s legal 
team indicating that a DOJ inquiry had ended as a result of Allianz’s cooperation with 
the investigation). The DOJ does not release data on most declinations, and thus it is 
hard to determine how often this happens. Declination appears to be more likely when 
the wrongdoing is limited and the firm self-reported and fully cooperated. See, for exam-
ple, Weissmann, FCPA Pilot Program at *4–9 (cited in note 6). 
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agrees not to seek conviction. Under an NPA, the prosecutor 
agrees not to file formal charges against the firm.27 Both types of 
PDAs enable prosecutors to sanction the firm without triggering 
the collateral consequences of a formal conviction, such as de-
barment or delicensing.28 Prosecutors’ ability to use PDAs to 
both sanction firms for misconduct and insulate them from 
mandatory collateral penalties triggered by conviction enables 
them to reward firms that helped deter misconduct through ef-
fective compliance, self-reporting, or full cooperation while still 
sanctioning the underlying crime. Prosecutors also respond to 
valued corporate policing by reducing the sanctions imposed 
through PDAs.29 
Thus, in practice, publicly held corporations are not held 
strictly liable for their employees’ crimes. Instead, publicly held 
firms are subject to a form of “duty-based” corporate criminal li-
ability.30 Duty-based liability imposes general up-front duties on 
all firms to adopt an effective compliance program, self-report 
detected wrongdoing, and fully cooperate with the government’s 
investigation. Should a substantive violation31 occur, corpora-
 
 27 See Alexander and Cohen, 52 Am Crim L Rev at 544–45 (cited in note 1). NPAs 
are expressed in the form of a letter, often not filed in court. See id at 544 n 38, 579 n 189. 
 28 Garrett, 93 Va L Rev at 855, 879 (cited in note 3). See also USAM § 9-28.1100 
(cited in note 6) (providing that collateral consequences of a corporate conviction, such as 
debarment and delicensing, can justify use of a PDA designed in part to promote compli-
ance with the law and prevent recidivism). It might appear that PDAs also enable the 
firm to avoid the reputational consequences of a criminal conviction. But under the 
DOJ’s current policy, it is unlikely that the decision of most prosecutors to impose a PDA 
instead of a guilty plea has a material effect on the reputational sanction, holding con-
stant the nature of the crime and other publicly disclosed information about the firm and 
the crime. See Cindy Alexander and Jennifer Arlen, Does Conviction Matter? The Repu-
tational and Collateral Effects of Corporate Crime *22–23 (forthcoming 2018), archived 
at http://perma.cc/HZ3W-5ABC. 
 29 See Weissmann, FCPA Pilot Program at *2–3, 8–9 (cited in note 6) (offering sub-
stantial fine mitigation to firms that self-report, fully cooperate, or had an effective com-
pliance program at the time of the crime). See also generally Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines (cited in note 5). 
 30 To be precise, corporate liability governing publicly held firms resembles what 
one of us has called “composite liability.” Under composite liability, firms are subject to 
both duty-based criminal liability and a residual layer of strict liability. See Arlen and 
Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev at 689–90, 770–75 (cited in note 6) (defining composite liabil-
ity and showing that composite liability with optimal policing duties and monetary sanc-
tions can be used to optimally deter corporate crime). For a discussion of when and why 
firms that satisfy all their policing duties should still bear monetary sanctions if a wrong 
occurs, see id at 695–718; Arlen, 8 J Legal Analysis at 198–204 (cited in note 8). 
 31 See note 7 (defining “substantive violation” as the term is used in this Article 
and distinguishing it from violations predicated on the failure to comply with policing 
duties). 
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tions that breach these duties face severe sanctions—including 
criminal conviction with substantial fines—whereas firms that 
satisfy these duties face no or lower sanctions. 
B. PDAs and Corporate Reform Mandates 
Today, firms with detected wrongdoing often satisfy some of 
their policing duties—for example, by fully cooperating with 
prosecutors. As a result, PDAs have become federal prosecutors’ 
primary tool for imposing sanctions on publicly held firms for 
many important offenses—other than antitrust, import/export 
and immigration, and environmental crimes—since 2003.32 
In a conventional PDA, the firm acknowledges that its em-
ployees committed the acts that constitute the crime, agrees to 
waive its right to a speedy trial, and agrees to fully cooperate 
with the prosecutors’ investigation. In return for the firm’s com-
pliance with the PDA, prosecutors agree to not seek the firm’s 
conviction. PDAs further provide that, if a firm fails to comply 
with the terms of the PDA, the prosecutor can proceed to convict 
the firm using its statement of facts admitting the crime against 
it.33 A firm that fails to comply with a PDA thus faces nearly 
 
 32 See Alexander and Cohen, 52 Am Crim L Rev at 571–72 (cited in note 1); Arlen, 
Corporate Criminal Liability at 149, 153 (cited in note 23) (comparing PDAs with federal 
convictions of publicly held firms). Pretrial diversion agreements were used prior to 
2003, most prominently in the 1994 PDA with Prudential Services, Inc. Mary Jo White, 
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, in 37th Annual Institute on Secu-
rities Regulation 815, 818 (Practising Law Institute 2005). Nevertheless, the 2003 DOJ 
memo was the first official endorsement of these agreements, and dramatically increased 
their use. See Larry D. Thompson, Memorandum: Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations *6 (DOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Jan 20, 2003) 
archived at http://perma.cc/4FEG-AATF (“Thompson Memo”). In the entire period prior 
to issuance of the Thompson Memo in January 2003, prosecutors negotiated only thir-
teen PDAs. See Garrett, 93 Va L Rev at 894 n 167 (cited in note 3). By contrast, we find 
based on our dataset that they entered into at least 267 PDAs from 2004 through 2014 
(excluding agreements involving antitrust, tax, and environmental violations). See also 
Alexander and Cohen, 52 Am Crim L Rev at 571 (cited in note 1) (finding that prosecu-
tors entered into 155 PDAs against publicly held firms for all crimes from 2003 through 
2011, and only 8 PDAs for antitrust or environmental violations). PDAs issued after the 
Thompson Memo are more likely to impose firm-specific policing duties and monitors. 
See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Proce-
dure, 82 NYU L Rev 311, 323 (2007); Spivack and Raman, 45 Am Crim L Rev at 166–67 
(cited in note 3). See also Baer, 50 BC L Rev at 969–70 (cited in note 11) (discussing the 
evolution in mandates after 2003). 
 33 See Garrett, 93 Va L Rev at 893–902 (cited in note 3); Alexander and Cohen, 52 
Am Crim L Rev at 538, 544, 587 (cited in note 1); Arlen, 8 J Legal Analysis at 199–203 
(cited in note 8). 
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guaranteed criminal conviction even when it does not commit 
any subsequent crime.34 
The majority of PDAs require firms to pay fines and other 
monetary penalties. Monetary penalties imposed through PDAs 
can be substantial.35 PDAs entered into by the US Attorney’s  
Office or the DOJ’s Criminal Division in 2010 through 2014 im-
posed mean fines of approximately $31.3 million. Total sanctions 
imposed on the entire corporate group at the time of the PDA 
averaged over $171.3 million.36 
In addition, most PDAs over the last ten years imposed at 
least one mandate, as shown in Table 1 (in Part I.C).37 PDA man-
dates usually govern the design and oversight of the firm’s com-
pliance program. Many PDA compliance mandates require firms 
to adopt a compliance program with specific features that the 
firm otherwise would not be required to employ.38 For example, 
 
 34 For example, in 2008 the DOJ concluded that Aibel Group failed to meet its obli-
gations under its PDA and revoked its PDA with the firm. The firm pleaded guilty to its 
original offense and was required to pay a $4.2 million fine and serve two years on or-
ganization probation. Plea Agreement, United States v Aibel Group Ltd, CR H-07-005, 
§§ 7, 20 at *2–3, 10 (SD Tex, Nov 7, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/Q556-GUYD. See 
also Christopher M. Matthews, Aruna Viswanatha, and Devlin Barrett, Justice Depart-
ment to Tear Up Past UBS Settlement (Wall St J, May 14, 2015), online at http://www 
.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-to-tear-up-past-ubs-settlement-1431645723 (visited 
Nov 4, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (discussing the DOJ’s move to convict UBS for 
its 2012 LIBOR fixing, notwithstanding a 2012 PDA, following discovery of additional 
wrongs that occurred after that agreement). Courts have held that prosecutors have dis-
cretion to determine whether a firm’s conduct constitutes a sufficient breach of PDA 
mandates to justify a decision to indict. See, for example, Stolt–Nielsen, SA v United 
States, 442 F3d 177, 187 (3d Cir 2006) (holding that “nonprosecution agreements may 
not form the basis for enjoining indictments before they issue”); United States v Goldfarb, 
2012 WL 3860756, *2–6 (ND Cal) (denying a motion to dismiss an indictment because 
the government had properly exercised its discretion in finding a lack of substantial per-
formance of the DPA mandates). 
 35 See Alexander and Cohen, 52 Am Crim L Rev at 538, 577 (cited in note 1). 
 36 Our data on sanctions and mandates imposed through PDAs are based on our 
analysis of all PDAs imposed by the US Attorneys’ Offices or the Criminal Division of the 
DOJ in cases governed by the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organiza-
tions and under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. Thus, we exclude antitrust 
and environmental PDAs, which are under the authority of the Antitrust and Environ-
ment Divisions, respectively, and have their own enforcement policies and sentencing 
guidelines. See id at 571–72 (finding few PDAs for antitrust or environmental violations). 
 37 Our findings are consistent with the results of Alexander and Cohen. See id at 589. 
 38 PDA-imposed compliance-program mandates regularly require firms to adopt 
compliance programs that differ materially from the programs that firms traditionally 
adopted voluntarily prior to the rise in PDA mandates. For example, a survey published 
in 2008 found that whereas voluntary programs often integrated compliance efforts into 
the corporate divisions most directly affected by compliance efforts, the mandated pro-
grams generally required the adoption of a compliance office separate from the core 
workings of the firm. Finder, McConnell, and Mitchell, 28 Corp Counsel Rev at 19 (cited 
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the PDA may mandate the type of compliance information to be 
collected, the type and frequency of employee training, or the 
additional due diligence procedures or specific policies governing 
payments and disbursements.39 PDAs can also require firms to 
materially increase compliance expenditures.40 Other compliance 
mandates simply require the firm to adopt an effective compli-
ance program as defined by the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines.41 Yet even these mandates can impose new duties on 
the firm, because, but for the PDA, the firm generally could not 
be sanctioned for its failure to adopt such a program unless a 
substantive violation occurs.42 We refer to mandates governing 
compliance and other efforts by the firm to detect violations of 
the law as “policing mandates.” 
Further, PDAs often include provisions governing internal 
and external oversight of the firm’s efforts to comply with the 
law. For example, a PDA may require the appointment of a chief 
compliance officer with authority to report directly to the 
 
in note 2). Moreover, voluntary programs tend to have compliance officers who report to 
the general counsel or the CEO. By contrast, mandated programs increasingly require 
that the chief compliance officer (CCO) be able to report directly to the board. Id. 
 39 See, for example, Nonprosecution Agreement, Merrill Lynch & Co, §§ 8–9 at *3–4 
(DOJ Enron Task Force, Sept 17, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/QCA5-VDPC (“Merrill 
Lynch NPA”). 
 40 PDA compliance provisions often dictate investment levels by stating that the 
firm has increased its compliance to a particular level (usually following negotiations 
with prosecutors) and agrees to maintain at least this investment in compliance going 
forward. See, for example, Non-prosecution Agreement, Alpha Natural Resources, Inc, § 5 
at *2 (USAO SD W Va 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/KY88-JMMJ (“Alpha NPA”); De-
ferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v HSBC Bank USA, NA, CR No 12-763, § 7 at 
*3 (EDNY filed Dec 11, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/W29S-FRWZ (“HSBC DPA”). 
 41 See Organizational Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1 (cited in note 5) (listing crite-
ria to be employed to determine whether the firm has an effective compliance program). 
For examples of statutory requirements to adopt and maintain compliance programs, see 
note 55. 
 42 Moreover, PDAs also can affect the measures the firm employs to satisfy § 8B2.1 
of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. Absent a PDA, directors can determine 
how best to comply with the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of effective 
compliance. By contrast, PDA mandates, as a practical matter, shift power to a specific 
prosecutor to determine whether the firm’s actions satisfy the standard set forth in the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, because a prosecutor who requires the firm to 
satisfy § 8B2.1 is free to indict the firm if the prosecutor determines that it breached the 
PDA. The threat of prosecutorial action is significant because, if the prosecutor does pro-
ceed, she will be armed with an admissible statement of guilt made by the firm. See, for 
example, Alpha NPA § 14 at *7 (cited in note 40). Prosecutors have particularly strong 
leverage over firms with NPAs because courts do not review a prosecutor’s decision to 
indict a firm deemed to be in breach of an NPA. See note 34 (discussing prosecutorial 
authority to determine whether a firm’s actions constitute a violation of the PDA that 
warrants sanction). 
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board;43 the addition of specific independent directors;44 the es-
tablishment of new board45 or senior management committees;46 
or the separation of the positions of CEO and chairman of the 
board.47 Most PDAs with mandates also require firms to regularly 
report to prosecutors and other federal authorities on the firm’s 
compliance activities.48 A substantial number of PDAs go even 
 
 43 Finder, McConnell, and Mitchell, 28 Corp Counsel Rev at 22–23 (cited in note 2). 
See also, for example, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v Computer Associates 
International, Inc, CR No 04-837, § 14(b) at *11 (EDNY filed Sept 22, 2004), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7RCC-LEHQ (“Computer Associates DPA”). 
 44 For example, Computer Associates International, Inc, was required to appoint 
three new independent directors to the board, including former SEC Commissioner 
Laura Unger. See Computer Associates DPA § 12 at *10–12 (cited in note 43). 
 45 For example, Computer Associates was required to create a compliance commit-
tee of the board. Computer Associates DPA § 12(b) at *10 (cited in note 43). 
 46 Merrill Lynch & Co was required to create a “Special Structured Products Com-
mittee” of senior management to review all complex financial transactions with a third 
party. See Merrill Lynch NPA Exhibit A at *1–2 (cited in note 39). General Re Corp’s 
PDA required a new complex transaction committee with the power to reject any pro-
posed transactions. See Nonprosecution Agreement, General Re Corp, § 14(c) at *5 (DOJ 
Criminal Division, Fraud Section, Jan 19, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/DT7D 
-WAJT (“General Re NPA”). Computer Associates and American Italian Pasta Company 
each were required to create a new “Disclosure Committee” consisting of C-suite execu-
tives and other senior management. Computer Associates DPA § 12(c) at *10 (cited in 
note 43); Nonprosecution Agreement, American Italian Pasta Co, § 7 at *2–3 (USAO WD 
Mo, Sept 15, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/B6ST-GA4A. Monsanto’s DPA required 
that the board create a new committee to oversee the appointment of all foreign agents 
and to evaluate all joint ventures. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v 
Monsanto Co, Appx B(3) at *2 (DDC filed Jan 6, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/3ZCU 
-QFCW (“Monsanto DPA”). 
 47 See, for example, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States Securities Ex-
change Commission v Bristol-Myers Squibb Co, Civil Action No 04-3680, § 8 at *3 (USAO 
D NJ, June 15, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/E5EC-5D5D (“BMS DPA”). 
 48 Firms whose PDAs require them to report annually or semiannually to federal 
authorities during the agreement include Schering-Plough Corp, Pfizer H.C.P. Corp, 
Baker Hughes, Inc, Merck & Co, Lufthansa Technik AG, Orthofix International, Tyco 
International, Ltd, Archer Daniels Midland Co, Deutsche Bank AG, and Daimler AG. 
Settlement Agreement and Release, Schering-Plough Corp, § 13 at *18 (USAO D Mass, 
Aug 29, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/AD4J-U928; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, 
United States v Pfizer H.C.P. Corp, CR No 12-169, § 13 at *10 (DDC filed Aug 7, 2012), 
archived at http://perma.cc/Y2GZ-G63Q; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States 
v Baker Hughes Inc, § 13 at *10 (SD Tex filed Apr 11, 2007), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3W8H-6UPH; Nonprosecution Agreement, Merck & Co, Exhibit 2 
§ 10(a)(6) at *12 (USAO D Mass, Nov 7, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/TU5E-VSMD; 
Nonprosecution Agreement, Lufthansa Technik AG, Appx B at *B1–B2 (DOJ, Criminal 
Division, Fraud Section, Dec 21, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/G496-V5N8; Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement, United States v Orthofix International, NV, § 10 at *9 (DOJ 
Criminal Section, Fraud Section, July 10, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3VA6-KJ6B; 
Nonprosecution Agreement, Tyco International, Ltd, Attachment C at *C1–C2 (USAO 
ED Va, Sept 20, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/452U-KKHZ; HSBC DPA § 6 at *8 
(cited in note 40); Nonprosecution Agreement, Archer Daniels Midland Co, Attachment C 
at *C-1 to -2 (USAO CD Ill, Dec 20, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/7DJG-CMTA;  
 338  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:323 
   
further and require firms to hire an outside monitor with au-
thority to audit the firm to ensure its compliance with the duties 
imposed by the agreement and, in some cases, seek evidence of 
additional wrongdoing.49 We refer to provisions governing the in-
ternal or external oversight of compliance as “metapolicing  
duties.” 
To understand the breadth of the mandates that can be im-
posed, consider the PDA that Bristol-Myers Squibb Co (BMS) 
agreed to in response to allegations of conspiracy to commit se-
curities fraud. Under the agreement, BMS agreed to adopt a 
compliance program with features specified in the PDA; to insti-
tute a training program covering specified topics; to separate the 
positions of chairman of the board and CEO; to have the chair-
man participate in preparatory meetings held by senior man-
agement prior to BMS’s quarterly conference calls with analysts; 
to have the chairman, CEO, and general counsel monitor these 
calls; to appoint an additional outside director to the board, ap-
proved by the US Attorney’s Office; to hire and pay for a  
prosecutor-approved corporate monitor with authority to oversee 
compliance with both the agreement and federal law and to re-
port to management and the prosecutor’s office; and, finally, to 
have the CEO and CFO make specific reports to the chairman of 
the board, the chief compliance officer, the monitor, and the SEC 
 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v Deutsche Bank AG, CR No 15-61, § 10 
at *14–15 (D Conn filed Apr 23, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4V9U-MPMB; De-
ferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v Daimler AG, CR No 10-63, Attachment D 
§ 7(e) at *3–5 (DDC filed Mar 24, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/C7J2-3DZ3. 
 49 For a detailed discussion of the monitoring provisions in these agreements, see 
Khanna and Dickinson, 105 Mich L Rev at 1721–24 (cited in note 3) (discussing corpo-
rate monitor provisions in PDAs). 
In addition, PDAs occasionally contain mandates that are more properly character-
ized as prevention, rather than policing, measures. Prevention measures reduce the 
probability of a violation, but (unlike policing measures) do not increase the likelihood of 
detection if a violation occurs. Mandates that alter a firm’s compensation and promotion 
policies in ways that make wrongdoing less attractive to employees are prevention 
measures. As one of us has shown, a company can be induced to undertake optimal pre-
vention measures through either strict or duty-based liability, whereas only duty-based 
liability can practically be used to induce optimal policing. Arlen and Kraakman, 72 
NYU L Rev at 717–18 (cited in note 6). Our analysis in Parts III and IV of when it is de-
sirable to supplement harm-contingent liability generally or with PDAs, as well as our 
discussion of how PDAs should be structured, applies equally well to PDAs with preven-
tion mandates, with one qualification. Firms tend to face strict (rather than duty-based) 
liability with regard to prevention measures, because DOJ leniency focuses appropriately 
on policing. In this situation, the arguments in Parts III.C and III.D relating to the use of 
PDAs to address limitations with duty-based liability are not relevant to the analysis. 
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relating to sales, earnings, budgeting and projections, and other 
matters.50 
C. Mandates as a New Form of Liability 
PDA policing mandates fundamentally change the structure 
of the corporate liability regime faced by publicly held firms. To 
identify these changes, we compare the core features of PDA 
mandates with those of more traditional corporate liability re-
gimes, both criminal and regulatory, governing publicly held 
firms. 
Corporate liability rules can be distinguished along two di-
mensions, as shown in Figure 1. The first is whether firm-level 
liability is strict or duty based. Corporate liability is strict when 
the firm is liable for all violations by its employees, as under re-
spondeat superior. Corporate liability is “duty based” to the ex-
tent that a firm is subject to higher (or any) sanctions for its 
employees’ actions only if it failed to engage in proper corporate-
level policing, for example, by failing to have an effective com-
pliance program, self-report, or cooperate.51 
The second dimension is whether liability is harm contin-
gent or non–harm contingent. Liability is harm contingent to the 
extent that liability is imposed only if the firm’s employees also 
committed a substantive violation.52 Liability is non–harm con-
tingent to the extent that a firm’s failure to adhere to its policing 
duties suffices to trigger liability.53 Traditional corporate crimi-
nal liability54 for publicly held firms, in effect, generally imposes 
liability that is harm contingent, as well as duty based. Criminal 
liability is harm contingent in that a corporation with inadequate 
 
 50 BMS DPA § 2 at *1 (cited in note 47) (describing the charges); id §§ 6–17 at *3–5 
(setting out the requirements for the compliance program); id § 18 at *5 (requiring the 
separation of the roles of chairman and CEO); id § 8 at *3 (requiring the chairman’s par-
ticipation in preparatory phone calls and requiring that the chairman, CEO, and general 
counsel monitor the calls); id § 9 at *3 (requiring the appointment of an outside director); 
id §§ 11–12 at *3–4 (requiring the appointment of a corporate monitor); id § 24 at *6–7 
(setting out reporting requirements for the CEO and CFO). 
 51 See note 6 and accompanying text (defining policing and prevention); note 30 
(discussing composite liability). 
 52 See note 7 (defining substantive violations). 
 53 In the case of individual liability, tort liability for injuries resulting from the 
defendant’s negligent failure to take reasonable care is an example of harm-contingent 
liability. Government-imposed sanctions on people who breach certain legal duties (for 
example, people who run a red light), whether or not a harm occurs, are an example of 
non-harm-contingent liability. 
 54 See note 5 (defining traditional corporate liability). 
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policing generally cannot be convicted for breaching its policing 
duties unless its employees committed a substantive criminal 
violation. By contrast, regulators regularly impose policing du-
ties enforced by non-harm-contingent corporate liability, sanc-
tioning firms for implementing an inadequate compliance pro-
gram even if no substantive violation occurred.55 
FIGURE 1.  TAXONOMY OF CORPORATE LIABILITY REGIMES 
  Duty-Based Liability 
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PDAs that impose mandates supplement traditional re-
gimes with a new form of criminal liability that differs from tra-
ditional corporate criminal and regulatory liability. First, tradi-
tional corporate criminal and regulatory liability imposes 
general policing duties on firms up front.56 By contrast, PDA 
mandates impose policing duties ex post after misconduct is de-
tected, and then only on select firms with detected wrongdoing.57 
Indeed, the duties imposed by PDAs are not merely imposed on 
 
 55 A few statutes, such as the accounting provisions of the FCPA and the Suspicious 
Activity Report provisions and Know Your Customer provisions of the PATRIOT Act, 
criminalize the willful failure to adopt or maintain an effective or reasonable compliance 
program. FCPA § 102, 91 Stat at 1494, codified at 15 USC § 78m(b)(2)(A)–(B); Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) §§ 311–30, Pub L No 107-56, 115 
Stat 272, 298–320; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 202–04, 404, Pub L No 107-204, 116 
Stat 745, 772–73, 789, codified at 15 USC §§ 78j-1, 7262 (requiring the existence of a ca-
pable and empowered audit committee and that financial statements be audited). 
 56 See notes 5–6. 
 57 Accordingly, in our view, these mandates are not simply a nonmonetary sanction 
for past wrongdoing. Sanctions generally are backward-looking in that they are designed 
to induce compliance with the original duty—here, the ex ante policing duty imposed on 
all publicly held firms. While the threat of PDA mandates may have ex ante effects, the 
specific mandates imposed create new duties that alter future conduct. For an alternate 
view, see Khanna and Dickinson, 105 Mich L Rev at 1727–40 (cited in note 3) (describing 
the imposition of a corporate monitor as an additional sanction). 
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firms ex post, but the content of the duties often is both deter-
mined ex post and specific to a single firm. Moreover, these firm-
specific duties regularly are fashioned by individual prosecutors’ 
offices with limited, if any, oversight by, or guidance from,  
the DOJ.58 
Second, whereas the traditional corporate criminal liability 
regime is harm contingent, PDA mandates impose non-harm-
contingent liability: a mere breach of a PDA mandate without 
any subsequent substantive violation can result in criminal 
sanctions. PDA mandates thus in effect transform individual 
prosecutors into firm-specific quasi regulators with authority to 
devise and impose new duties on a firm with detected wrongdo-
ing, enforced by liability that is non–harm contingent. 
Federal policy and practice encourages this exercise of ad 
hoc regulatory authority by prosecutors.59 Federal enforcement 
policy favors the imposition of compliance programs and other 
mandates on those firms that did not have an effective compliance 
 
 58 See note 62. 
 59 Although the USAM does not have an explicit provision governing when man-
dates should be incorporated into PDAs, it does state that prosecutors proceeding 
against firms should bear in mind all the goals of enforcement, including rehabilitation. 
Subsequent provisions governing corporate plea agreements provide that in order to en-
sure corporate rehabilitation, it is 
appropriate to require the corporation, as a condition of probation, to imple-
ment a compliance program or to reform an existing one. As discussed above, 
prosecutors may consult with the appropriate state and federal agencies and 
components of the Justice Department to ensure that a proposed compliance 
program is adequate and meets industry standards and best practices. 
USAM § 9-28.1500(B) (cited in note 6) (emphasis added). 
The USAM also indicates that prosecutors should charge and sentence defendant 
companies in a manner consistent with the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. The 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines recommend using probation to require firms to 
reform their compliance programs whenever a firm with over fifty employees did not 
have an effective compliance program at the time of sentencing. Organizational Sentenc-
ing Guidelines § 8D1.1(a)(3) (cited in note 5). The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
do not appear to support the imposition of prosecutor-designed mandates, however, in 
that the Guidelines recommend that the organization develop the effective compliance 
program. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines § 8D1.4(b) (cited in note 5) (recommend-
ing that judges require organizations with defective compliance programs to “develop 
and submit to the court an effective compliance and ethics program consistent with 
§ 8B2.1 (Effective Compliance and Ethics Program)”). 
In the case of monitor mandates, the DOJ treats self-reporting as a factor weighing 
against the mandate. See A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act *71 
(DOJ, Criminal Division and SEC, Enforcement Division, Nov 14, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2VTV-D5HD (“FCPA Resource Guide”) (summarizing DOJ and SEC policy 
on when compliance monitors are appropriately appointed). 
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program.60 Consistent with that policy, the vast majority of 
PDAs impose mandates: as seen in Table 1, from 2008 to 2014, 
approximately 82 percent of the PDAs entered into by the DOJ 
Criminal Division or the US Attorneys’ Offices imposed compli-
ance program mandates, and more than 30 percent imposed out-
side monitors.61 In addition, the DOJ has failed to supervise 
prosecutors or to adopt clear guidelines governing the type of 
PDA mandates imposed.62 It has thereby effectively granted 
 
 60 Prosecutors evaluate the effectiveness of the program both at the time of the of-
fense and at the time of the agreement. Firms that reform their programs after the of-
fense may avoid mandates altogether, but prosecutors often impose mandates that either 
require firms to continue their preagreement reforms, require new reforms, or both. See, 
for example, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Zimmer, Inc, §§ 4–5, 9 at *1–2 (USAO D 
NJ 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/D3KY-44R8 (“Zimmer DPA”); Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, United States v Unico, Inc, CR No 13-355, §§ 4–5, 8–9 at *2–5, 7 (SD Cal 
filed Jan 30, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/R46U-KDGY (“Unico DPA”); Settlement 
Agreement, Mellon Bank, NA, § I(11) at *2, Appx A at *1–3 (USAO WD Pa, Aug 14, 
2006), archived at http://perma.cc/Q6FJ-EZWE; Nonprosecution Agreement, Deutsche 
Telekom AG, Appx B at *B-1 to -2 (USAO ED Va, Sept 29, 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9HVY-UC4G; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v 
MoneyGram International Inc, Case No 12-291, § 9 at *7 (MD Pa filed Nov 9, 2012), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/4Z87-54F5; Nonprosecution Agreement, Ralph Lauren Corp, *1, 
Attachment B at *B-1 to -8 (DOJ, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, Apr 22, 2013), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/9XZL-7X3C; General Re NPA § 14 at *5–7 (cited in note 46); 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v CommunityOne Bank, NA, CR No 11-
122, § 7 at *6–7 (WD NC filed Apr 27, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/5SZB-RU6Z; 
Nonprosecution Agreement, Las Vegas Sands Corp, Attachment B(1) at *16–18 (USAO 
CD Cal, Aug 26, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/P77P-HH8X; Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, Smith & Nephew, Inc, § 7 at *6 (DOJ, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, Feb 
1, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/32EK-832X (“Smith & Nephew DPA”); Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement, United States v Academi LLC, CR No 12-14, §§ 7–9 at *6–7 (ED 
NC filed Aug 7, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/SXS5-UB3R (imposing a monitor in 
addition to the reforms already undertaken); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United 
States v Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc, CR No 14-66, §§ I(c), V at *2, 16–24 (NDNY filed Feb 
21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5CK2-H88U. 
 61 For our methodology, see note 36. 
 62 The DOJ has a decentralized approach to prosecution. Each individual US attor-
ney generally exercises full authority over the content of PDAs, except in a limited set of 
cases in which enforcement decisions are channeled through specialized divisions within 
Main Justice—for example, FCPA, antitrust, tax, and environmental cases. See note 36. 
In addition, the DOJ has not provided guidelines governing the policing mandates 
that prosecutors can impose governing corporate policing and other internal governance 
matters. The few guidelines issued on mandates apply to (and limit the use of) a narrow 
range of provisions: extraordinary restitution, waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the 
firm’s right to advance the legal fees of its employees, and the decision to impose a corpo-
rate monitor. USAM §§ 9-16.325, 9-28.1000, 9-28.710 (cited in note 6). See also generally 
Craig S. Morford, Memorandum for Heads of Department Components, United States At-
torneys: Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-
prosecution Agreements with Corporations (DOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 
Mar 7, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/6NF2-8TXK. 
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prosecutors enormous discretion to determine what duties 
should be imposed through PDAs.63 
 
Commentators have called for increased DOJ guidance for 
prosecutors on when PDA mandates should be imposed and 
 
By contrast, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines recommend that prosecu-
tors impose compliance mandates on all firms subject to probation, but do not encourage 
prosecutors to design their own. Instead, they indicate that prosecutors should require 
firms to adopt a compliance program that satisfies the standard of effective compliance 
set forth in the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. Organizational Sentencing Guide-
lines § 8D1.4(b)(1) (cited in note 5). Moreover, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
envision that judges, not prosecutors, will determine what mandates are imposed, as the 
Guidelines were structured to govern formal conviction. See Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, Commentary on § 8D1.4 (cited in note 5). 
 63 At present, the judiciary also does not assert oversight of the types of mandates 
imposed. Only DPAs are potentially subject to judicial review; NPAs, by contrast, are not 
filed in court. The DOJ takes the position, now supported by the limited case law, that 
federal judges reviewing DPAs do not have authority to reject or alter specific mandates 
imposed. See United States v Fokker Services BV, 818 F3d 733, 740–42 (DC Cir 2016); 
Government’s Supplemental Brief Addressing the Scope of the Court’s Authority to Con-
sider the Fairness and Reasonableness of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Deciding 
Whether to Accept or Reject the Agreement, United States v Saena Tech Corp, CR No 14-
66, *8–10 (DDC filed Aug 8, 2014); Government’s Reply to Memorandum of Law of Ami-
cus Curiae Law Professor, United States v Saena Tech Corp, CR No 14-66, *1 (DDC filed 
Aug 29, 2014). One district court has held that judges do have authority to review man-
dates that violate the Constitution, a statute, or the USAM. See United States v HSBC 
Bank USA, NA, 2013 WL 3306161, *6–13 (EDNY) (discussing the Government’s posi-
tion). The DC Circuit in Fokker explicitly chose not to address the validity of this conclu-
sion. See Arlen, 8 J Legal Analysis at 217–20 (cited in note 8) (discussing in more detail 
the Fokker decision and the narrow scope of judicial review over PDAs). 
 64 “Public firms” include all publicly held firms and all firms that are controlled (50 
percent or more) by a publicly held firm. 
TABLE 1.  POLICING MANDATES IMPOSED THROUGH PDAS, 
2008–2014 
  Year 
Total 
PDAs 
Public 
Firms64 
Compliance 
Program Monitor 
   Other 
Mandates 
2008–14 185 130._ 70% 
152._ 
82% 
58._ 
31% 
138._ 
75% 
 
2008–10 76 60._ 79% 
60._ 
79% 
26._ 
34% 
55._ 
72% 
 
2011–14 109 70._ 64% 
92._ 
84% 
32._ 
29% 
83._ 
76% 
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what they should entail.65 To provide such guidance, however, 
one must understand how mandates fit into the corporate liabil-
ity regime and what shortcomings in the regime they are de-
signed to address. To date, neither the DOJ nor academic com-
mentators have provided a satisfactory analysis of these issues. 
The remainder of this Article seeks to fill this void. 
II.  LIABILITY REGIMES AND DETERRENCE 
The current broad federal policy and practice favoring the 
imposition of policing mandates raises the question, addressed 
in this Part, whether it is appropriate for prosecutors to impose 
PDA mandates whenever a firm did not have an effective com-
pliance program at the time of the crime. 
To address this question, we first identify in Section A a 
central purpose of corporate criminal liability for publicly held 
firms—inducing optimal corporate policing. In Sections B and C, 
we then analyze whether this goal is best served through the 
imposition of ex post mandates on all firms with deficient com-
pliance. To address this issue, we examine whether PDA man-
dates are superior to reliance on general ex ante duties imposed 
by the more traditional corporate liability regimes with ade-
quate monetary sanctions.66 In Section D, we conclude that PDA 
mandates are neither needed nor desirable as a general re-
sponse to firms with deficient compliance programs. Duty-based 
corporate liability with adequate monetary sanctions is superior. 
Whether PDA mandates are justified in more limited circum-
stances is discussed in Part III. 
A. Optimal Deterrence in Publicly Held Firms 
Criminal law cannot optimally deter crime by publicly held 
firms unless the individuals responsible for the crime are per-
sonally sanctioned for the wrongs they commit.67 Corporate 
 
 65 See note 9. 
 66 In theory, strict liability could be employed, but only if fines could practicably 
adjust so that any corporate action that increases the probability of detection and sanc-
tion produces an equivalent reduction in the fine. Arlen and Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev 
at 719–23 (cited in note 6). 
 67 See Arlen, 23 J Legal Stud at 852–55 (cited in note 10); Arlen and Kraakman, 72 
NYU L Rev at 695–96 (cited in note 6); Sally Quillian Yates, Memorandum: Individual 
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing *1–2 (DOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Sept 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PBC2-TZPX (discussing the importance of 
individual liability for corporate crime). By contrast, corporate liability could be used to 
optimally deter crime by owner-managers of closely held firms, provided that the firms 
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sanctions alone are not sufficient because, in publicly held firms, 
the individuals who actually commit crimes68 generally own only 
a small percentage of the firm’s stock. Thus, these individuals 
are not likely to be motivated to commit corporate crimes by the 
benefits they derive as shareholders. Instead, they are motivated 
by personal benefits—such as increased job security, additional 
compensation, or promotion—resulting from undetected crimes 
that boost real or apparent profits.69 Put differently, crimes by 
publicly held firms often are an agency cost, best deterred by im-
posing liability directly on the individual wrongdoers.70 
Nevertheless, individual liability alone generally cannot op-
timally deter corporate misconduct by publicly held firms. Left 
to their own resources, enforcement authorities may be unable to 
detect wrongdoing or to sanction individual wrongdoers with suf-
ficient regularity to ensure that crime does not pay.71 Evidence of 
 
have sufficient assets to pay the optimal fine. Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability at 
157–58 (cited in note 23) (discussing corporate liability for closely held firms). 
 68 This discussion focuses on the type of corporate crimes that cause direct social 
harm, such as securities fraud and bribery, which generally require affirmative acts by 
individuals who know they are acting unlawfully. This discussion does not apply to crim-
inal liability imposed for breach of corporations’ oversight duties. Responsibility for com-
pliance with these duties can be diffuse, and there can be circumstances in which the 
firm is liable (or subject to a PDA) even though no individual in the firm made an af-
firmative decision to violate the law for personal benefit. 
 69 Many of the gains employees seek—such as promotions, bonuses, and avoiding 
termination—are one-way effects: an employee can get a promotion or bonus by commit-
ting a crime to benefit the firm, and the employee may retain it even if the wrong is de-
tected, either because the wrong is not attributed to the employee or because the firm 
decides not to sanction or fire the employee. See Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability at 
170–71 (cited in note 23) (discussing why the government generally cannot rely on corpo-
rate liability alone to optimally deter crime by employees of publicly held firms). 
 70 See Arlen, 23 J Legal Stud at 834–36 (cited in note 10); Jonathan R. Macey, 
Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 BU L Rev 315, 322 
(1991); Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability at 154 n 39 (cited in note 23) (discussing why 
corporate crime can be treated as the product of self-interested rational decision-making 
even if many street crimes are not). See also Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen, 
Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an 
Agency Cost, 5 J Corp Fin 1, 30–31 (1999) (finding that corporate crimes “occur less fre-
quently among publicly traded firms in which top management has a larger ownership 
stake,” consistent with corporate crime being an agency cost); Jennifer H. Arlen and  
William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evi-
dence, 1992 U Ill L Rev 691, 701–03 (discussing whether securities fraud is an agency 
cost arising in the shadow of a managerial last period as a result of the low expected 
costs of fraud, which could include civil liability and job loss). 
 71 Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability at 167–71 (cited in note 23) (providing the 
conditions that would be necessary for individual liability alone to create optimal deter-
rence). See also Arlen and Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev at 695–96 (cited in note 6); Alexander 
Dyck, Adair Morse, and Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J 
Fin 2213, 2225–26 (2010) (providing evidence that most corporate fraud is not detected by 
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crimes by employees of publicly held firms rarely lies out in the 
open. Detecting crime, identifying wrongdoers, and obtaining 
the evidence needed to convict them requires significant up-front 
expenditures to monitor corporate activities, as well as signifi-
cant resources devoted to investigations of suspected wrongs 
(corporate policing). Firms are often far better able than the 
government to undertake these policing activities.72 Thus, to ef-
fectively deter most crimes by employees of publicly held firms, 
government enforcers must induce firms to come to their aid by 
adopting compliance programs designed to detect crime, investi-
gating suspected wrongs, self-reporting, and cooperating with 
the government’s efforts to prosecute individuals.73 
Corporate policing measures are costly, however. A firm will 
not incur these costs unless the benefit to it from adopting cor-
porate policing exceeds the cost. A regime in which corporate li-
ability is duty based—such that firms with deficient policing 
face higher sanctions—can provide firms with the requisite  
 
the government, including data that suggest that industry regulators discover only 13 
percent of fraud cases that come to light). 
Individual liability fails to optimally deter when the probability of detection and 
sanction is very low for two reasons. First, rational actors are not deterred unless the 
expected sanction—given by the sanction multiplied by the probability of sanction, P—
equals or exceeds the benefit of crime, B. Thus, the actual sanction must at least equal B 
divided by P. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J 
Polit Econ 169, 180–85 (1968). When the probability of sanction is low, the optimal sanc-
tion will often exceed the amount that can be optimally imposed on individuals given 
their limited wealth and the high social cost of imprisonment. Id at 196–97. Second, be-
havioral analysis suggests that individuals may not be deterred when the probability of 
sanction is too low because people often discount very low probability events to zero. Eric 
A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications for Tort and 
Contract Law, 11 S Ct Econ Rev 125, 127–28 (2004). Corporate liability should reduce 
both problems because well-structured corporate liability should increase the probability 
that individuals are sanctioned, thereby increasing individuals’ expected sanctions and 
lowering the optimal individual sanction. See Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability at 
186–87 (cited in note 23). 
 72 Arlen and Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev at 700–01 (cited in note 6) (comparing gov-
ernment monitoring and investigation with firms’ more cost-effective internal policing 
mechanisms). For a detailed discussion of why firms are the least-cost provider of many 
policing measures, see Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability at 162–67 (cited in note 23). 
 73 Arlen and Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev at 706–07 (cited in note 6); Arlen, Corpo-
rate Criminal Liability at 164–66 (cited in note 23). Firms also can lower the net social 
cost of crime both by adopting prevention measures, such as compensation policy reform, 
see Arlen and Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev at 701–04 (cited in note 6), and by reducing ac-
tivity levels. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to 
Fines and Imprisonment given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 Intl Rev L & 
Econ 239, 246–47 (1993). 
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incentive to adopt optimal policing.74 Corporate liability needs to 
be duty based both because effective corporate policing imposes 
substantial direct costs75 and because it increases the probability 
that enforcement authorities will detect and sanction corporate 
misconduct. To induce firms to bear both these direct expenses 
and the increased probability of sanction, corporate sanctions 
imposed for detected wrongdoing must be adjusted so that firms 
face lower expected liability if they police optimally than if they 
do not. Thus, firms that engage in proper policing need to be 
subject to a substantially lower sanction should employees 
commit a crime.76 Corporate liability that is duty based can en-
sure that firms are better off if they engage in optimal policing, 
provided that the government imposes appropriate monetary 
sanctions on firms with deficient policing.77 
 
 74 To be precise, firms should be subject to a composite liability regime that com-
bines enhanced duty-based criminal liability for failure to adopt effective policing with 
strict civil liability for any harm caused. See note 30 and accompanying text. Duty-based 
liability is superior to strict respondeat superior because firms subject to strict corporate 
liability with a fixed fine have suboptimal incentives to undertake measures that in-
crease the probability that wrongdoing is detected and sanctioned, as these actions can 
increase the firm’s own expected liability. See Arlen, 23 J Legal Stud at 836 (cited in 
note 10); Arlen and Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev at 700, 707 & n 46 (cited in note 6); Arlen, 
Corporate Criminal Liability at 174–77 (cited in note 23) (showing that respondeat supe-
rior with a fixed fine cannot induce both optimal prevention and policing). For a confir-
mation of this phenomenon and a statistical assessment of how to shift incentives, see 
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Be-
havior, 102 J Polit Econ 583, 587–90 (1994) (showing that individuals can be induced to 
self-report by reducing the sanction to counteract the liability-enhancing effect of self-
reporting on the probability of sanction). 
 75 Ex ante corporate policing in the form of compliance programs can be very ex-
pensive. For example, according to HSBC’s 2012 DPA, the firm spent over $290 million 
on antifraud and money-laundering compliance in 2011 alone. HSBC DPA Attachment A 
§ 81 at *27–28 (cited in note 40). 
 76 Criminal liability should be reserved for firms that violate their policing duties, 
as this enables the state to offer a sufficiently big reward to firms that comply with their 
policing duties to make them willing to self-report, even when substantial civil sanctions 
will be imposed. 
 77 Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability at 185–87 (cited in note 23); Arlen and 
Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev at 709–12 (cited in note 6). Firms that comply with all their 
policing duties generally should not be exempt from sanctions. There should still be re-
sidual liability sufficient to induce them to pursue optimal prevention measures, such as 
reforming compensation and promotion systems. See Arlen and Kraakman, 72 NYU L 
Rev at 694, 726–30 (cited in note 6). 
In fact, federal authorities should use multiple levels of duty-based sanction en-
hancements targeted at specific types of policing because policing measures occur se-
quentially over time. Firms that undertake optimal policing should bear expected sanc-
tions equal to the social cost of the crime in order to induce optimal prevention. Id at 
726–30. See also note 30. For an in-depth discussion of the justifications for and optimal 
structure of corporate liability, see generally Arlen and Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev 687 
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DOJ policy and practice encourages prosecutors to supple-
ment duty-based corporate liability with PDA mandates for 
firms that have deficient compliance. PDA mandates have two 
core features. First, they impose policing duties ex post on select 
firms with detected wrongdoing, instead of ex ante on all (or a 
specified subset of) firms. Second, liability for breach of these 
PDA mandates may be imposed even if no substantive violation 
occurs. In the next two Sections, we examine whether these two 
features of PDA mandates—ex post duties and non-harm-
contingent sanctions—justify the imposition of PDA mandates 
on firms with detected wrongdoing that did not have an effective 
compliance program. To assess PDA mandates, we compare 
them with the primary alternative approach to sanctioning defi-
cient policing: imposing ex ante duties on all firms that are en-
forced by adequate monetary sanctions for breach. 
B. Advantages of Ex Ante Rules over PDA Mandates 
The primary distinguishing features of PDA policing man-
dates are that they impose duties only on firms with detected 
wrongdoing and do so in an ad hoc fashion.78 PDA policing man-
dates thus differ from both duty-based corporate criminal liability 
and ex ante regulation, which each impose general duties up front 
on all firms (or on a subset of firms with particular characteris-
tics, such as financial institutions or publicly traded companies). 
Ex ante duties have an obvious advantage over mandates 
imposed selectively on firms with detected wrongdoing: the po-
licing duties imposed—and thus the incentives they create—
apply to a wider set of firms. Ex ante rules are presumably su-
perior whenever it would be desirable to impose policing duties 
on a broader set of firms that includes firms without detected 
wrongdoing. 
A further difference between ex ante duties and PDA man-
dates lies in the identity of the government body in charge of 
the decision to impose a duty and the design of the duty. Ex 
 
(cited in note 6). See also Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability at 177–85 (cited in note 
23). Nevertheless, firms that police optimally should not bear monetary sanctions when 
shareholders internalize the full cost of the crime absent liability, as is often the case 
with securities fraud. See Arlen and Carney, 1992 U Ill L Rev at 713 (cited in note 70); 
Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability at 187–88 (cited in note 23). 
 78 This analysis focuses on the deterrence implications of having ex post mandates 
on firms with prior detected wrongdoing. For a discussion of the rule-of-law issues raised 
by prosecutors’ authority to create ad hoc mandates, usually without any genuine exter-
nal review, see generally Arlen, 8 J Legal Analysis 191 (cited in note 8). 
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ante duties are often imposed through rules adopted by regula-
tory agencies or central enforcement authorities (for example, 
the US Sentencing Commission) after careful deliberation and 
after obtaining input from experts, the affected parties, and the 
public. These bodies generally have subject matter expertise and 
mechanisms for obtaining information on the costs and effec-
tiveness of policing measures.79 By contrast, PDA mandates are 
fashioned by individual prosecutors’ offices,80 with little effective 
guidance from the DOJ.81 With the exception of substantive vio-
lations that tend to be handled by a single prosecutorial office—
for example, violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
197782 (FCPA)—the prosecutors designing PDA mandates may 
have no expertise with the type of violation involved.83 Moreover, 
even when prosecutors have experience with a particular type of 
violation, they still may lack the expertise needed to design and 
impose an optimal compliance program tailored to firms in a 
particular industry or with a particular organizational structure 
and to determine whether liability for failure to adopt such a 
program should be harm contingent or non–harm contingent. 
Finally, prosecutors often lack the resources or incentives to pro-
vide ongoing assessments of the policing measures they impose.84 
 
 79 Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecuto-
rial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in Barkow and Barkow, eds, Prosecutors in 
the Boardroom 62, 79–81 (cited in note 9). For additional discussion of informational ad-
vantages, see Baer, 50 BC L Rev at 1003–04 (cited in note 11). 
 80 Prosecutors’ offices vary significantly in their use of PDAs. A small number of US 
Attorneys’ Offices and DOJ divisions are responsible for the vast majority of PDAs. See 
GAO Report at *3 (cited in note 25) (reporting the results of a preliminary survey finding 
only twelve offices with two or more PDAs). The content of PDAs also varies. The varia-
tion is greatest in the PDAs imposed by US Attorneys’ Offices. There is more consistency 
in the PDAs imposed by the specialized enforcement divisions of the DOJ, such as the 
Fraud and Money Laundering Sections. See note 62. 
 81 See note 62; Arlen, 8 J Legal Analysis at 204–05 (cited in note 8) (noting that 
neither the DOJ nor the judiciary provides guidance or oversight that could constrain 
the policing mandates that prosecutors impose in most cases). 
 82 Pub L No 95-213, 91 Stat 1494, codified as amended at 15 USC § 78a et seq. 
 83 Assistant US attorneys in certain US Attorney’s Offices—such as the Southern 
District of New York, Eastern District of New York, and District of New Jersey—and in 
specialized sections, such as those covering antitrust, environmental, the Foreign  
Corrupt Practice Act, fraud, money laundering, and tax cases, often will have considera-
ble expertise in this area. Yet many assistant US attorneys in other offices do not. 
 84 Although some prosecutors work directly with regulators in designing PDAs, 
many do not. GAO Report at *17 (cited in note 25) (noting that eight of thirteen offices 
interviewed stated that their prosecutors commonly design compliance programs with 
the cooperation of the relevant regulatory agency). Those who do work with regulators 
retain full authority to impose the mandates they prefer. See Arlen, Removing Prosecu-
tors from the Boardroom at 79–81 (cited in note 79) (discussing the benefits of vesting 
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The fact that regulators generally have greater experience and 
access to more information than the prosecutors who impose 
PDA mandates is a further reason why it is generally preferable 
to impose policing duties through ex ante rules rather than 
through PDA mandates. 
C. Advantages of Harm-Contingent Corporate Liability 
Whereas traditional corporate criminal liability uses harm-
contingent liability to sanction breaches of policing duties, PDA 
mandates impose non-harm-contingent liability. This shift to 
non-harm-contingent liability does not provide a reason to favor 
PDA mandates. 
First, many breaches of policing duties are more effectively 
deterred by imposing harm-contingent liability on firms that 
commit substantive violations, instead of imposing non-harm-
contingent liability.85 Indeed, the fact that firms without prior 
detected wrongdoing are not subject to liability for the breach of 
the policing duties that prosecutors impose through PDAs sug-
gests, at least prima facie, that imposition of non-harm-
contingent liability for breach of these duties is questionable. 
Moreover, even if non-harm-contingent liability is advisable, it is 
generally more effective when used to enforce general ex ante 
duties imposed by legislation or regulation than when used to 
enforce firm-specific duties imposed ex post by PDA mandates. 
Corporate policing entails duties along four separate dimen-
sions: adoption of an effective compliance program; effective 
oversight of the program, including the proper response to re-
ports of suspicious activities; self-reporting of detected wrongdo-
ing; and cooperation with enforcement authorities. Most of these 
policing duties—such as duties to respond effectively to evidence 
of wrongdoing,86 self-report detected wrongdoing, and cooperate 
 
regulators with primary authority over mandates). See also Baer, 50 BC L Rev at 972–75 
(cited in note 11) (critiquing the current system). 
 85 See Arlen and Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev at 694 (cited in note 6) (arguing that 
duty-based, harm-contingent liability is the superior scheme to induce optimal policing 
measures). 
 86 The duty to have an effective compliance program is composed of two subduties—
an ex ante duty to adopt an effective compliance program and an ex post duty to oversee 
it effectively and respond appropriately to red flags. This latter duty arises only once 
there is suspected wrongdoing. See In re Caremark International Inc Derivative Litiga-
tion, 698 A2d 959, 967–71 (Del Chanc 1996) (holding that directors have a duty to share-
holders to adopt an effective monitoring and reporting system and to oversee it in good 
faith). See also Stone v Ritter, 911 A2d 362, 370 (Del 2006) (en banc) (adopting the duty 
and standard of liability announced in Caremark). 
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with enforcement authorities—arise, and thus can be breached, 
only in the context of an actual or suspected substantive viola-
tion. Harm-contingent liability is effective as applied to these 
duties because it focuses the state’s limited enforcement re-
sources on evaluating the firm’s adherence to its policing duties 
in those situations in which all of the firm’s policing duties have 
arisen and evaluation of breach can encompass the full panoply 
of duties. By contrast, inducing policing by deploying enforce-
ment resources in the absence of any wrongdoing is generally 
less effective because several dimensions of corporate policing 
will have yet to arise. 
Of course, some policing duties arise before any wrongdoing 
occurs. For example, firms may have investigatory duties when 
wrongdoing is suspected, even if no wrongdoing occurred. Never-
theless, harm-contingent enforcement actions tend to be superior, 
because bringing enforcement actions in the absence of actual 
wrongdoing could present an increased risk of error. When en-
forcement authorities evaluate policing by firms that have not 
actually committed a substantive violation, they could conclude 
that the firm failed to properly investigate and report a suspected 
violation even if the firm had a reasonable basis for being confi-
dent that no such violation occurred. 
In addition, firms should adopt and maintain an effective 
compliance program regardless of whether any wrongdoing has 
occurred in the past. Again, however, focusing enforcement re-
sources on firms that also committed a substantive violation will 
tend to be a more cost-effective way to induce effective compli-
ance. Although prosecutors can evaluate certain facets of a com-
pliance program prior to any wrongdoing—such as whether the 
firm established a compliance office and hired a compliance of-
ficer at all—most aspects of a compliance program’s effective-
ness depend on soft inputs, including the level of attention, 
commitment, and courage of the compliance department, which 
are difficult to evaluate in the abstract. Enforcement authorities 
can better distinguish firms with “paper” compliance programs 
from those with genuine compliance programs by examining 
how compliance programs operate in the context of an actual 
substantive violation.87 Core compliance features that can be  
 
 87 For a discussion of the problem of cosmetic compliance programs, see William S. 
Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 Vand L 
Rev 1343, 1415–19 (1999) (observing that “cosmetic compliance” programs, adopted solely 
to reduce the firm’s liability and not to truly reduce corporate crime, could result in  
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assessed ex ante tend to be better imposed and enforced by regu-
lation than by PDA mandates that impose duties on select firms 
ad hoc.88 
D. Summary 
Compared to more traditional corporate liability regimes, 
PDA mandates—which are imposed selectively on firms with 
prior wrongdoing—suffer from three shortcomings. Most im-
portantly, the traditional regimes are presumably superior 
whenever it would be desirable to impose additional policing du-
ties (enforced by higher sanctions) on a broader set of firms that 
includes firms without detected wrongdoing. Moreover, PDA 
mandates subject firms to criminal liability for policing deficien-
cies even if firms commit no further substantive violations. Such 
a broad imposition of non-harm-contingent criminal liability by 
prosecutors is questionable. Third, the content of the PDA duties 
is fashioned in an ad hoc manner by prosecutors. Ad hoc firm-
specific mandates are not an appropriate response to all firms 
that failed to implement an effective compliance program. Ab-
sent the specific special considerations discussed below, regula-
tors (or central authorities within the DOJ) are better equipped 
than are individual prosecutors to determine appropriate polic-
ing duties to be imposed on firms. Thus, as a general matter, it 
 
increased crime when combined with a corporate leniency program). For an argument 
that internal compliance is ineffective at deterring corporate crime, see Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 Wash U L 
Q 487, 510–15 (2003). 
In the torts context, others have argued that harm-contingent enforcement is more 
cost-effective because it focuses enforcement resources on firms that are more likely to 
have violated their duties. The idea is that, if compliance with legal duties reduces the 
risk of harm, firms with detected harms are probably more likely to be firms that failed 
to satisfy their duties. As a result, negligence liability, which is limited to firms that 
caused harm, may be more cost-effective than ex ante regulation that requires more gen-
eral monitoring of firms. See Steven Shavell, A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Ad-
vantage of the Negligence Rule over Regulation, 42 J Legal Stud 275, 276, 281–87 (2013). 
This argument from the torts context does not apply to corporate crime, however, be-
cause corporate policing has two competing effects. On the one hand, it reduces the prob-
ability of crime. On the other, it increases the probability that wrongs that occur are de-
tected and sanctioned. Arlen, 23 J Legal Stud at 834–36 (cited in note 10); Arlen and 
Kraakman, 72 NYU L Rev at 707 (cited in note 6). Thus, a firm with detected misconduct 
could have a weak compliance program—and thus be a proper target for the govern-
ment’s limited enforcement resources—or, alternatively, it could have an exceptionally 
effective policing program that detected and reported isolated misconduct. 
 88 See Part II.B. 
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is not optimal to impose PDA mandates in response to deficient 
corporate policing. 
III.  ARE PDAS OPTIMAL IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES? 
Although duty-based corporate criminal liability and ex ante 
regulations are generally superior to PDA mandates, PDA man-
dates may be appropriate when, and only when, these more tra-
ditional liability regimes cannot be relied on to induce optimal 
policing. In this Part, we identify and evaluate those possible 
situations. 
We conclude that there is only one circumstance in which 
the traditional regimes should be supplemented by PDA man-
dates: when a firm is plagued by significant policing agency 
costs, in that top managers with direct or indirect authority over 
policing benefit personally either from tolerating wrongdoing or 
from deficient policing. Policing agency costs combine three fea-
tures that, in combination, make it difficult to provide proper in-
centives through either corporate criminal liability or its stan-
dard alternative, ex ante regulation. First, in the presence of 
policing agency costs, sanctions imposed on the firm may not 
provide sufficient incentives on managers to act in the firm’s 
best interests when designing or overseeing compliance or decid-
ing whether to self-report and cooperate. Second, it is difficult to 
identify firms in which policing agency costs are significant 
through clear, ex ante criteria. Third, prosecutors may have an 
advantage over regulators in identifying such firms on a case-by-
case basis.89 In combination, these three factors make it, in some 
cases, desirable to supplement duty-based, harm-contingent cor-
porate liability or ex ante regulations with properly designed 
PDA mandates. 
In Section A, we discuss why, in the presence of policing 
agency costs, PDA mandates may be desirable. In Section B, we 
explain why other arguable deficiencies in the traditional liabil-
ity regime, such as corporate asset insufficiency, are not properly 
addressed by PDA mandates. 
 
 89 Our discussion of prosecutors applies as well to regulatory enforcement officials 
who intervene ex post, after a crime has occurred. Although we conclude that prosecutors 
should be well positioned to identify firms plagued by policing agency costs, we concur 
that they would benefit from better guidance from the DOJ and more input from regula-
tory experts in determining how best to design mandates. 
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A. Policing Agency Costs 
Duty-based corporate liability—whether imposed as tradi-
tional, harm-contingent liability or through ex ante regula-
tions—can generally induce firms to adopt optimal policing 
when firms are managed in the interest of shareholders. But it 
will not suffice to induce optimal corporate policing when man-
agers benefit personally from making policing decisions that are 
not optimal from the perspective of shareholders. This can occur 
when managers obtain personal benefits from facilitating sub-
stantive crimes or ensuring a low probability that wrongdoing is 
detected and sanctioned. In addition, senior managers may es-
chew policing measures that entail oversight of their own ac-
tions by compliance officers, even if they plan to comply with the 
law, when oversight reduces their power and thwarts their au-
tonomy.90 In these situations, even when a corporate liability re-
gime is structured such that taking optimal policing measures is 
in the shareholders’ interests, managers of some firms will have 
self-interested reasons to induce or tolerate suboptimal polic-
ing.91 We refer to private benefits that undermine managers’ in-
centives to police in the best interest of shareholders as “policing 
agency costs.” 
Policing agency costs are particularly likely to infect corpo-
rate enforcement decisions when managers own only a small 
portion of the firm’s stock and thus do not directly bear much of 
the cost of sanctions imposed on the firm for failure to satisfy 
 
 90 Of course, compliance programs can benefit managers and directors, by providing 
them higher-quality information about the firm that enables them to perform their man-
agerial and oversight functions at lower cost. But compliance programs can also impose a 
burden. For example, additional record keeping, bureaucracy, and oversight can impede 
managers’ ability to act quickly or creatively on important business matters. Managers 
may also find compliance programs costly when the firm is operating in an area in which 
the legal duties are vague, as the compliance officer may, in an abundance of caution, 
constrain the firm from taking profitable actions that are generally legal but are suscep-
tible to abuse. 
 91 For example, consider a CEO of a health care company whose compensation is 
strongly linked to the firm’s profits at the end of the year. The CEO could benefit per-
sonally from a loose compliance program that allows the firm’s managers in other coun-
tries to enter into consulting and joint venture arrangements with favored doctors at 
large overseas hospitals that are likely to promote sales to these hospitals. This compli-
ance program could benefit the CEO, even when it is not optimal for the firm, because 
the program creates a material risk of liability for the firm under the bribery and ac-
counting provisions of the FCPA should authorities determine that the payments were 
made to induce doctors at government-run health facilities to favor the firm. By contrast, 
the CEO can likely retain the bonuses earned, without fear of personal liability, as long as 
there is no evidence that he willfully caused any deficiencies. See 15 USC §§ 78dd-2, 78ff. 
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policing duties.92 Thus, publicly held firms, whose managers 
generally own a small portion of the shares, are more likely than 
owner-managed, closely held firms to have high policing agency 
costs. Nevertheless, although all publicly held firms suffer from 
some general agency costs, not all (or even most) publicly held 
firms have high policing agency costs. Because policing often 
does not involve issues, such as executive compensation or cor-
porate control, on which the interests of managers and share-
holders are likely to conflict, policing agency costs may not sig-
nificantly affect corporate policing decisions. Whether a publicly 
held firm exhibits high policing agency costs depends on various 
considerations that impact managers’ private incentives to un-
dermine corporate policing. These include expected benefits of 
and penalties for misconduct, managers’ expected tenure, the 
structure of the firm’s compensation and promotion policies,93 
the firm’s financial situation, the degree to which the board 
monitors managers, and whether the firm has an active control-
ling shareholder who ensures that the firm’s policing serves 
shareholders’ interests. Thus, policing agency costs are likely to 
be significant only for a subset of publicly traded firms in which 
the combination of the compensation structure, the management 
structure, the board’s structure and composition, the type of 
business the firm is engaged in, the type of criminal liability to 
which the firm is subject, and the feasibility of board oversight 
of compliance enables managers both to benefit ex ante from 
suboptimal policing and to implement it unchecked.94 
The following comparison between two firms can help clarify 
the distinction between general and policing agency costs. Con-
sider a publicly held firm whose senior managers’ compensation 
depends on cash bonuses tied to long-run firm performance. 
They own only a small percentage of the shares and have no un-
vested options. They also are relatively young, and thus their fu-
ture expected wealth depends on retaining their positions over 
the next decades. When evaluating takeover bids and other 
 
 92 See notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 93 Publicly held firms can use compensation policy to reduce or enhance policing 
agency costs: policing agency costs are increased to the extent that compensation is 
structured to enable managers to benefit from increases in the stock price or in corporate 
performance over the short term more than they are harmed by declines over a longer 
term. 
 94 Firms with high policing agency costs thus are firms in which neither the share-
holders nor the outside directors are able (or willing) to intervene effectively to align 
managements’ interests with those of shareholders.  
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threats to their tenure, these managers would be plagued by 
agency costs because they would obtain private benefits from re-
sisting a hostile bidder intent on replacing them, even if the bid 
is in shareholders’ best interests. Yet these same managers will 
not be plagued by policing agency costs affecting their decisions 
about whether to implement a compliance program that deters 
wrongdoing by those below them. Assuming that traditional cor-
porate liability ensures that deterring crime and corporate polic-
ing are in the shareholders’ long-run best interests, managers 
with compensation tied to the firm’s long-run performance also 
benefit from deterring misconduct and implementing optimal 
policing. 
By contrast, consider the incentives of a different group of 
senior managers, which includes both the chief financial officer 
and the chief compliance officer. Assume that each of these 
managers will earn substantial incentive pay this year and next 
if, but only if, the firm earns higher revenues. This bonus consti-
tutes a significant portion of their expected future earnings from 
the firm because either they are all due to retire shortly or the 
firm is underperforming and institutional shareholders will seek 
their ouster should things not improve. The firm is expanding 
into new territory rife with corruption. Weak compliance will 
boost short-run revenues by enabling sales obtained through 
bribery. But it will harm the firm in the long run because the 
expected sanctions for bribery exceed the benefit to the firm of 
the crime. In this situation, managers may intentionally fail to 
implement effective policing—even though shareholders want 
them to—because they obtain immediate private benefits from 
corruption and do not expect to bear any costs that may eventu-
ally be imposed on the firms. These managers are plagued by po-
licing agency costs, which will manifest themselves in a deficient 
compliance program and intentionally ineffective responses to 
signals of wrongdoing.95 
 
 95 Policing agency costs also may be present in situations in which the CEO or CFO 
of an underperforming firm commits a crime, such as securities fraud, that could be ex-
pected to confer private benefits on both the CEO and all of senior management. See  
Arlen and Carney, 1992 U Ill L Rev at 703 (cited in note 70) (explaining that intentional 
securities fraud by managers of publicly held firms is an agency cost that is not readily 
deterred by strict corporate liability, because top managers generally benefit if the wrong 
remains undetected). In this situation, detecting the crime and firing the CEO may not 
address the problem that management of the firm remains vulnerable—assuming it con-
tinues to underperform—and may continue to benefit from weak attention to compliance 
with financial reporting requirements. Thus, cases involving companies such as Unico 
Corporation and Swisher Hygiene, which both apparently pertained to securities fraud 
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When the firm is plagued by significant policing agency 
costs, authorities cannot rely solely on the threat of sanctions 
imposed on the firm for inadequate policing to induce optimal 
policing. The very presence of policing agency costs undermines 
the incentive effects of corporate sanctions, because managers 
benefit from deficient policing even when the firm does not. In 
these situations, it may be desirable to intervene to address po-
licing agency costs through measures that would not be desir-
able absent such costs.96 
One possible approach is to impose duties that are struc-
tured to combat policing agency costs. Another approach is to 
hold managers personally liable for the firm’s failure to satisfy 
its policing duties. PDA mandates can be an example of the first 
approach. PDA mandates are justified as a remedy to policing 
 
committed by the CEO and CFO, may be examples of situations in which policing agency 
costs justify mandates if it is true that, after the executives were fired, managers in 
charge of policing would likely continue to obtain direct or indirect private benefits from 
deficient compliance. See Unico DPA Attachment A §§ 3–4 at *14–15 (cited in note 60); 
Y. Peter Kang, Former Swisher Hygiene Execs Indicted for Securities Fraud (Law360, 
Oct 19, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/C6NZ-6RV4 (describing how the CFO of 
Swisher Hygiene was indicted for securities fraud conspiracy). See also Deferred Prose-
cution Agreement, United States v Swisher Hygiene Inc, CR No 15-237, § 1 at *1 (WD NC 
filed Oct 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZL5S-LYDD. 
 96 Without a controlling shareholder, individual shareholders generally cannot ef-
fectively impose or monitor corporate compliance efforts. The establishment and design 
of corporate compliance efforts is the role of the board, and shareholders lack the power, 
under general principles of corporate law, to require the board to establish a certain pro-
gram. See, for example, 8 Del Code Ann § 141. Shareholders could try to request that the 
board establish a program through a shareholder resolution under Rule 14a-8 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, but the complexity of a program and the five-hundred-
word limit for proposals under that rule would make it hard to get an effective rule 
adopted. See 17 CFR § 240.14a-8. Even if shareholders adopted a proposal, it would be 
difficult to monitor compliance, because many of the features that distinguish a truly 
effective program from an ineffective one involve matters that cannot easily be verified. 
Directors can often take actions to reduce policing agency costs, using many of the 
same measures that prosecutors often impose through PDA mandates. When a board has 
failed to do so, prosecutors should assess why before imposing mandates. In some cir-
cumstances, it may be sufficient for prosecutors to bring policing agency costs to the at-
tention of the board and leave it to the board to take proper remedial measures. In other 
circumstances, however, prior deficiencies signal that the board cannot be relied on to 
adopt effective policing. Directors may be plagued by significant policing agency costs 
themselves, lack the incentives to confront managers, or be unlikely to remain diligent in 
maintaining and monitoring compliance with their policies unless the policies are part of 
a PDA mandate. The fact that the board did not properly address policing agency costs 
prior to the substantive violation that gave rise to a PDA suggests that one of these fac-
tors may be present. 
Of course, when shareholders or directors do, or can be expected to, respond appro-
priately to policing agency costs, mandates are unlikely to be needed, as we discuss in 
Part IV. 
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agency costs if three conditions are met. First, the duties im-
posed by the PDA are properly designed to address policing 
agency costs. Second, imposing these duties through PDAs ex 
post (after a substantive violation has occurred) is superior to 
imposing them through ex ante regulation. Finally, mandates 
are superior to liability imposed directly on managers for failure 
to undertake optimal policing. The next three Sections address 
these conditions. 
1. Using policing and metapolicing duties to reduce agency 
costs. 
One way to address policing agency costs is to impose addi-
tional duties on affected firms, either through PDAs or through 
ex ante regulation. The root problem of policing agency costs is 
that managers can benefit from a firm’s failure to comply with 
its policing duties even though compliance would be in the firm’s 
best interest. Accordingly, in order to reduce policing agency 
costs effectively, it is not sufficient to impose policing duties ex-
pressed as broad standards enforced solely through corporate 
sanctions, as with duty-based corporate criminal liability.97 In-
stead, policing duties must be structured to make it harder or 
more costly for managers to have the firm pursue suboptimal 
 
 97 For example, the effective compliance program provisions of the Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines are phrased as a broad general standard: 
To have an effective compliance and ethics program, for purposes of subsec-
tion (f) of § 8C2.5 (Culpability Score) and subsection (b)(1) of § 8D1.4 (Recom-
mended Conditions of Probation - Organizations), an organization shall— 
 (1) exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct; and 
 (2) otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical 
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law. 
 Such compliance and ethics program shall be reasonably designed, imple-
mented, and enforced so that the program is generally effective in preventing 
and detecting criminal conduct. The failure to prevent or detect the instant of-
fense does not necessarily mean that the program is not generally effective in 
preventing and detecting criminal conduct. 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines § 8B2.1(a) (cited in note 5). 
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines do state that, in order to be effective, 
most programs will need to satisfy a list of conditions, but most of these features are also 
quite general. For example, one section provides, “The organization shall use reasonable 
efforts not to include within the substantial authority personnel of the organization any 
individual whom the organization knew, or should have known through the exercise of 
due diligence, has engaged in illegal activities or other conduct inconsistent with an ef-
fective compliance and ethics program.” Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
§ 8B2.1(b)(3) (cited in note 5). 
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policing. Two types of duties can be used, separately or in con-
cert, to achieve this goal. 
First, PDA mandates or ex ante regulations can require the 
firm to undertake specific verifiable policing measures. For  
example, mandates can specify the type of information to be col-
lected, require enhanced oversight over specific high-risk busi-
ness arrangements, or require creation of an internal whistle-
blowing program with specified features designed to facilitate 
internal reporting to people trained to respond appropriately. 
Imposition of specific policing duties can incentivize managers, 
even though liability ostensibly falls on the firm, if the required 
policing measures are clearly specified and senior managers 
know that they will be held responsible for ensuring that the 
company undertakes them. If the duty is clear and senior man-
agers are responsible for ensuring compliance, then these man-
agers can expect to be blamed and sanctioned by shareholders, 
independent directors, and the market for any criminal penal-
ties imposed on the firm as a result of their failure to comply 
with these duties. Possible sanctions on managers include ter-
mination, reduced compensation, a suit for breach of fiduciary 
duty under In re Caremark International Inc Derivative Litiga-
tion,98 and reputational harm.99 As a result, if a firm violates a 
specific policing measure, the expected costs to the responsible 
managers are substantially higher than they would be if a firm 
violates the firm’s existing ex ante policing duties, for which 
both the scope of the policing duties and the identity of the man-
ager responsible for compliance may be more ambiguous. Be-
cause specific policing duties enforced by non-harm-contingent 
liability raise the expected costs to management (as opposed to 
just the cost to the firm and shareholders) for policing failures, 
they are a plausible device for reducing policing agency costs. 
Second, PDA mandates or ex ante regulations can mute po-
licing agency costs by relocating authority over policing from 
 
 98 698 A2d 959, 967–70 (Del Chanc 1996). 
 99 When policing duties and lines of authority are clear, shareholders of firms sanc-
tioned for deficient policing can determine both whether managers breached a known 
duty and who is to blame for such a breach. This enables them to pressure the firm to 
terminate the agent. They are also better able to impose liability on directors and man-
agers for bad-faith breaches of their oversight duties under Caremark. See id at 971. See 
also Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis–Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolv-
ing Duty to Monitor, in J. Mark Ramseyer, ed, Corporate Law Stories 323, 344 (Founda-
tion Press 2009) (discussing how Caremark liability is effective at inducing effective 
compliance only if the compliance duty is clearly defined). 
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persons within the firm who are afflicted by significant policing 
agency costs to other persons, within or outside of the firm, who 
are not. Because this approach relates to the oversight, or polic-
ing, of corporate policing, we refer to it as “metapolicing.” The 
required metapolicing can be internal or external. 
Internal metapolicing measures shift authority over, and in-
formation about, corporate policing to people within the firm 
who are less plagued by policing agency costs, such as outside 
directors. Examples of such metapolicing duties include the re-
quirements in the BMS PDA that certain reports be submitted 
to the chairman of the board (a position that the BMS PDA 
states may not be held by the CEO) and that the chairman at-
tend certain meetings.100 Other examples of internal metapolic-
ing duties include requiring that the chief compliance officer be 
separate from the general counsel’s office and have authority to 
report directly to the board of directors, and requiring that the 
board of directors oversee the response to whistle-blowing. 
External metapolicing measures give individuals outside 
the firm access to information about, and oversight authority 
over, the firm’s compliance program. These external duties are 
generally needed when the outside directors cannot or will not 
provide the oversight needed to induce optimal policing.101 Ex-
ternal metapolicing can take the form of oversight accomplished 
through reporting obligations to, and periodic audits by, en-
forcement authorities or independent auditors. It can also be ac-
complished by requiring the firm to hire a monitor who has the 
authority to investigate the firm’s compliance with its policing 
mandates and the law and who reports her findings to enforce-
ment authorities. 
As to both internal and external metapolicing, there is little 
concern that the company will fail to comply with its metapolic-
ing duties. As long as internal metapolicing duties are specific, 
and sanctions for breach render compliance cost-effective, the 
outside directors can generally be relied on to ensure that the 
firm complies. For example, directors of a firm who are required 
to make sure that the chief compliance officer is given the  
 
 100 BMS DPA §§ 23–24 at *6–7 (cited in note 47). 
 101 For example, outside directors often cannot provide sufficient oversight because 
they do not have the time to devote to policing oversight. They also may lack the infor-
mation needed to effectively police compliance, because genuine oversight over compli-
ance often requires in-depth knowledge of the firm’s overseas subsidiaries and indepen-
dent contractors. 
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authority to report directly to the board are likely to do so. The 
directors would not benefit directly from breach and would risk 
shareholder wrath (and potential liability) if they deliberately 
failed to ensure that the firm complies with the mandate.102 Ex-
ternal metapolicing duties in turn provide their own oversight. 
Prosecutors can readily oversee whether the firm is complying 
with its external metapolicing duties, such as to report to prose-
cutors, to hire a monitor, or to regularly report to regulators. 
This should be sufficient to ensure that the firm complies with 
these duties. 
2. PDA mandates versus ex ante regulation. 
Authorities could impose specific policing duties or metapo-
licing duties on firms with heightened policing agency costs by 
using either PDAs or ex ante regulations. The central difference 
is that ex ante regulations impose generally applicable duties on 
all firms, or on firms meeting certain criteria, regardless of 
whether a wrong was detected. PDA mandates, by contrast, can 
impose duties only on firms with detected wrongdoing. 
This distinction would appear to favor regulation because 
policing agency costs are significant in many firms without de-
tected wrongdoing. Regulating policing agency costs through 
PDA mandates, rather than ex ante regulation, thus fails to 
reach many firms afflicted by policing agency costs. 
But even though PDA mandates tend to be underinclusive, 
they may sometimes be superior to ex ante regulation. As we 
explain in this Section, ex ante regulation will generally cover 
too many firms, and it may be more beneficial to address polic-
ing agency costs through underinclusive PDA mandates than 
through overinclusive regulation. The reason why ex ante regu-
lation will tend to be overinclusive is that regulatory authorities 
cannot easily identify firms with high policing agency costs 
based on criteria they can easily observe ex ante. Beyond the 
fact that a low managerial ownership stake is a prerequisite for 
 
 102 Directors are liable if they fail to act in good faith to ensure that the firm adopts 
an effective monitoring and reporting program and takes other mandated actions to en-
sure compliance with the law. These duties should include any duties mandated by a 
PDA. See Caremark, 698 A2d at 971; Stone v Ritter, 911 A2d 362, 369–70 (Del 2006) (en 
banc) (endorsing the Caremark duty and holding that a failure to act in good faith is es-
sential to establishing director oversight liability). Thus, directors may face personal lia-
bility if they consciously disregard their oversight duties by failing to ensure that the 
firm complies with the metapolicing duties imposed on the firm by a PDA. 
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the existence of significant policing agency costs,103 policing 
agency costs are not associated with any particular easily identi-
fiable structural features of the firm. Regulators attempting to 
specify the set of firms subject to additional duties ex ante would 
inevitably either have to use criteria that capture both firms 
with high policing agency costs and firms at which policing 
agency costs are low, or have to rely on a costly case-by-case in-
vestigation to determine whether a firm should become subject 
to additional duties.104 
By contrast, prosecutors can use PDAs to target mandates 
at firms with high policing agency costs. PDA mandates are im-
posed after the firm has had the opportunity to employ its polic-
ing measures and has been investigated for committing a sub-
stantive crime. Prosecutors often obtain information about the 
firm’s policing in the course, and as a by-product, of their inves-
tigations. In addition, they obtain this information when the 
quality of policing is best observed: when a firm has committed a 
substantive violation. Moreover, given that prosecutors already 
have to spend resources investigating an alleged substantive 
crime and the company’s policing, they may also be able to iden-
tify firms with high policing agency costs at no or relatively low 
marginal cost. For example, prosecutors may learn specific facts 
that indicate that senior managers with influence over policing 
benefited from deficient policing—for example, because the 
wrongdoing enabled managers to achieve a short-term bonus 
target and fend off an attack by a shareholder activist—and that 
top management subtly discouraged or failed to pursue a full-
scale investigation of the wrongdoing for their own benefit. Al-
ternatively, they might learn both that an imperial CEO imple-
mented a relatively ineffective compliance program governing 
financial reporting and oversight to enhance his own autonomy 
and free him from oversight, and that the board was aware of 
only the general outline of the program and failed to focus on the 
specific features that rendered the program ineffective. Distin-
guishing simple policing failures from those produced by policing 
 
 103 See Alexander and Cohen, 5 J Corp Fin at 30–32 (cited in note 70). 
 104 Uncertainty about whether the firm is subject to mandates designed to address 
policing agency costs can also undermine the effectiveness of policing and metapolicing 
duties enforced by sanctions imposed on the firm. When firms are plagued by policing 
agency costs, corporate liability is effective only if managers who could cause breach ex-
pect to be held responsible. Directors and shareholders are more likely to—and better 
able to—proceed against managers who clearly knew the duties they were required to 
comply with and who thus cannot claim that any noncompliance was in good faith. 
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agency costs thus requires consideration of factors that are often 
more easily observed by prosecutors ex post than by regulators 
ex ante. Unlike regulations, PDA mandates that are imposed 
postcrime, on a firm-by-firm basis, can therefore avoid the over-
breadth problem. 
Thus, ex ante regulation and PDA mandates each have ad-
vantages over the other depending on the circumstances. The 
central advantage (and disadvantage) of ex ante regulation as 
compared to PDA mandates is that it is broader in scope. On the 
one hand, it generally reaches more firms with policing agency 
costs than PDA mandates would, including firms with no detect-
ed wrongdoing. On the other, it also applies to more firms with-
out policing agency costs. Accordingly, regulation is generally 
superior to PDAs when the benefits of broad imposition of the 
duties exceed the costs of overbreadth. Ex ante regulation may 
thus be superior for imposing duties that entail low net costs 
even for firms without substantial policing agency costs but gen-
erate significant benefits for firms with high policing agency 
costs. In such circumstances, it may be desirable to address po-
licing agency costs by imposing ex ante regulatory duties on all 
publicly traded firms or on all such firms without a dominant 
shareholder.105 
By contrast, PDA mandates are likely to be superior to ex 
ante regulation for imposing specific policing duties and metapo-
licing duties that are optimally imposed only on the subset of 
firms that are plagued by significant policing agency costs, be-
cause they generate significant net social costs when imposed on 
firms without substantial policing agency costs. Compliance 
with several policing and metapolicing duties imposed by PDAs 
that address policing agency costs is indeed very costly.106 The 
costs include not just direct out-of-pocket expenses associated 
with compliance—which can be considerable—but also the po-
tential adverse effect that the policing and metapolicing have on 
the firm’s productivity. Policing imposes layers of oversight and 
scrutiny that may delay decision-making and reduce indepen-
dent initiative. In addition, mandated policing may crowd out a 
 
 105 Indeed, legislation or regulations sometimes impose such duties. For example, all 
public companies are required both to have their financial statements audited by an in-
dependent auditor and to place a board audit committee consisting of nonmanagement 
directors in charge of the audit. See 15 USC § 7262; 15 USC § 78j-1 (requiring the exist-
ence of a capable and empowered audit committee). Both of these provisions are exam-
ples of metapolicing duties. 
 106 See note 90. 
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different, more effective policing system that loyal managers 
(that is, those without policing agency costs) would have insti-
tuted on their own accord. Thus, PDAs are likely to be the pref-
erable mode for imposing monitorships and other measures that 
are not cost-effective in firms without substantial policing agency 
costs. 
PDAs are also preferable for imposing policing and metapo-
licing mandates designed to address specific policing agency 
costs salient in particular firms. The postcrime investigation 
provides information about the specific nature of the firm’s agency 
cost problem. This can enable prosecutors to impose duties that 
are designed to address the specific problem at hand. For exam-
ple, the prosecutor can better determine ex post whether meta-
policing should be done internally or requires external oversight. 
While prosecutors should have guidance on how to make these 
decisions, ex post imposition of mandates tailored to the specific 
situation of the firm may be superior to mandates imposed ex 
ante by regulators. 
To be sure, because PDA mandates can be imposed only on 
firms with prior detected wrongdoing, they are an imperfect 
mechanism for addressing policing agency costs. PDA mandates 
will not reach firms with high policing agency costs that have no 
detected wrongdoing. Still, given the difficulty in identifying 
firms with high policing agency costs ex ante, PDA mandates 
are likely to be superior to ex ante regulation for imposing those 
policing and metapolicing duties that are optimal only when 
targeted at firms with high policing agency costs. 
3. PDA mandates versus agent liability. 
PDA mandates are justified by policing agency costs only if 
they are superior to (or are needed as a supplement to) duties 
enforced by personal liability on the agents responsible for the 
company’s failure to undertake proper policing. Individual liabil-
ity imposed on managers and directors who fail to implement 
the required policing is, in theory, the most direct way to ad-
dress policing agency costs. Yet there are several reasons why 
individual liability for breach of a corporate policing duty either 
should not be imposed or should be supplemented with PDA 
mandates that impose corporate liability for policing breaches. 
In practice, imposing direct agent liability for a general 
failure to act in order to ensure adequate corporate policing is 
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difficult.107 First, in a corporate structure that involves many 
employees with authority to influence policing, it is often impos-
sible to identify a single person who should be held responsible 
for a failure to act. This is particularly true of compliance, which 
requires decisions by the board and many officers, as well as at-
tention across divisions of the firm and its subsidiaries.108 
Second, to the extent that such a person can be identified, 
broad personal managerial liability for any deficiency in the 
firm’s policing is likely to induce managers to have the company 
engage in excessive policing. If, as is usually the case, the pre-
cise scope of the policing duty is not completely clear, individual 
managers will inevitably worry that, in hindsight, their policing 
efforts will be deemed deficient should a crime occur. Imposing 
liability on upper-level managers and directors with control over 
the firm’s purse strings can be expected to induce excessive ex-
penditures on policing because managers spending the firm’s 
money will overinvest in compliance if doing so could reduce 
their own expected personal liability.109 
 
 107 For a discussion of the difficulties of holding directors liable for corporate crimes, 
see Assaf Hamdani and Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 Mich L 
Rev 1677, 1686–88 (2007). 
 108 For example, the failure to adopt and maintain an effective compliance program 
with respect to the FCPA regarding Country X could be attributed to a variety of people, 
including (i) the compliance officers in Country X, (ii) the head of the compliance de-
partment for the firm as a whole, (iii) the CFO who set the budget for the compliance de-
partment, (iv) the CEO who appointed the CFO and the head of the compliance depart-
ment and to whom the CFO and the head of the compliance department reported, or 
(v) the board of directors. 
 109 Managers are particularly likely to divert excessive attention to compliance 
when that activity is directly regulated by sanctions but alternative activities (such as 
making good business decisions) are not closely supervised. For a discussion of the incen-
tives surrounding task separation, see Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom, Multitask 
Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J L 
Econ & Org 24, 43–50 (Special Issue 1991). 
On the other hand, it may be difficult to hold a lower-level executive, who does not 
control the amount the company spends on compliance or the structure of the program, 
responsible for policing failures partly attributable to decisions outside his control. If the 
person identified as bearing personal responsibility for the company’s failure to comply 
has no control over the amount the company spends on compliance, it may also be diffi-
cult to find someone to take the position. To be sure, for the right price, the company will 
be able to fill the position. Note, however, that the requisite compensation structure––
high salary to compensate for the possibility of legal sanction for failure to comply––is 
likely to be attractive to individuals who are risk seekers, which may not be the optimal 
personality type for a person in charge of compliance. 
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In addition, even when individual managerial liability is 
appropriate,110 PDA mandates may be needed to supplement this 
liability because it often will not be possible to adequately deter 
this misconduct through individual liability alone. The person 
identified as responsible for policing may have insufficient as-
sets to satisfy the optimal liability amount, or the person may be 
outside the jurisdiction of the United States and beyond the 
reach of its criminal and civil authorities. Thus, imposing liabil-
ity only on managers for the firm’s failure to police properly may 
not be effective in addressing policing agency costs. PDA man-
dates that relocate authority over policing decisions or have the 
effect of exposing managers outside US jurisdiction to sanctions 
by the firm could compensate for these deficiencies in an agent 
liability regime. 
B. Asset Insufficiency 
Besides policing agency costs, there is one other set of cir-
cumstances in which sanctions imposed on the firm may not 
provide adequate incentives to take proper policing measures: 
when firms do not have sufficient net assets to pay the optimal 
sanction (asset insufficiency).111 
Asset insufficiency tends to have a greater negative impact 
on deterrence when firms are subject to harm-contingent liabil-
ity than when potential liability is non–harm contingent, such 
as under ex ante regulation and PDA mandates. Thus, when 
firms are asset constrained, it may often be desirable to impose 
non-harm-contingent sanctions on firms. 
Asset insufficiency is less of a concern under non-harm-
contingent liability because the optimal non-harm-contingent 
sanction is generally substantially lower than the optimal harm-
contingent sanction.112 The explanation for why optimal sanctions 
 
 110 For example, personal liability may well be appropriate when managers or direc-
tors intentionally acted in bad faith to cause the firm to fail to adopt or maintain an ef-
fective compliance program. 
 111 See generally S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 Intl Rev L & Econ 45 
(1986) (showing that tort liability does not provide optimal incentives when the defend-
ant’s wealth is less than the optimal damage award). See also Arlen, Corporate Criminal 
Liability at 170–71 (cited in note 23) (arguing that duty-based corporate liability will not 
induce optimal policing if the firm does not have sufficient assets to pay the optimal en-
hanced sanction for failing to police optimally and that individual liability, when used in 
combination with corporate liability, may reduce this problem). 
 112 This discussion tracks the general argument for why ex ante regulation is supe-
rior to tort liability when injurers are asset constrained. Steven Shavell, Liability for 
Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J Legal Stud 357, 360–61 (1984) (identifying asset 
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can be lower when liability is non–harm contingent is best illus-
trated through an example. Assume that it is optimal to induce 
firms to invest an amount C in corporate policing (for example, 
compliance). In order to induce firms to incur this cost, the gov-
ernment must ensure that each firm’s expected costs are lower if 
it invests C in compliance than if it does not.113 Enforcement au-
thorities can provide this incentive by imposing a duty to have 
effective policing enforced by a fine of F on any firm that breaches 
this duty. As long as the expected sanction, P × F, imposed on 
firms with poor compliance—given by the amount of the fine (F) 
multiplied by the probability that policing breaches are sanc-
tioned (P)—equals or exceeds the cost of optimal compliance (C), 
the firm will undertake optimal compliance. Accordingly, firms 
will police optimally so long as the sanction for inadequate polic-
ing, F, equals or exceeds the cost of optimal compliance divided 
by the probability that liability is imposed, C/P.114 As a result, 
when the probability that a firm will be sanctioned (P) is higher, 
the requisite sanction (F) needed to induce firms to invest C in 
policing is lower. 
Non-harm-contingent liability entails a higher probability of 
sanction than does harm-contingent liability. With non-harm-
contingent liability, the government can sanction any firms it 
detects breaching their policing duties, both those that also 
committed a substantive crime and those that did not. By con-
trast, with harm-contingent liability, enforcement authorities 
can sanction a firm that they detect a breaching duty only if, in 
addition, the firm commits a substantive crime and the authori-
ties detect it. Because non-harm-contingent liability entails a 
higher probability of sanction than harm-contingent liability, 
the optimal sanction is lower. Accordingly, even when a firm 
 
insufficiency as a justification for employing ex ante regulation instead of just liability 
for any harm caused); Khanna and Dickinson, 105 Mich L Rev at 1729–31 (cited in note 
3) (concluding that corporate asset insufficiency is one of the primary justifications for 
imposing corporate monitors). See also generally Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal 
Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J Econ 271 (1984) (proving that regula-
tion is more likely than liability to induce efficient levels of care if the regulated parties 
have assets below a certain threshold). 
 113 By contrast, in order to induce optimal compliance with a duty, the government 
needs to ensure that the firm is better off incurring the costs to comply with the duty 
whenever the social cost of compliance is less than the expected cost to society of the in-
creased crimes that result from the firm’s failure to comply. 
 114 Arlen, 23 J Legal Stud at 862–65 (cited in note 10). See also Becker, 76 J Polit 
Econ at 179–85 (cited in note 71) (discussing the optimal sanctions when some violations 
escape sanction). 
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would not have sufficient assets to pay the harm-contingent 
sanction required to induce optimal policing, enforcement au-
thorities may still be able to use non-harm-contingent sanctions 
to induce optimal policing because the requisite sanctions are 
lower. 
Asset insufficiency thus justifies supplementing or replacing 
harm-contingent duty-based liability with non-harm-contingent 
duty-based liability. PDA mandates constitute such a supple-
ment, yet they are not the appropriate solution for firms that 
cannot pay the optimal harm-contingent sanctions.115 Instead, 
asset insufficiency should be addressed through ex ante regula-
tions that impose policing duties and non-harm-contingent sanc-
tions on firms that may not have sufficient assets to pay the op-
timal harm-contingent sanction. Ex ante regulations are more 
effective at dealing with asset insufficiency than PDA mandates 
are, because ex ante regulations can impose non-harm-
contingent liability in all contexts in which asset insufficiency is 
a concern. By contrast, PDA mandates can impose non-harm-
contingent liability on only those firms with prior detected 
wrongdoing—leaving all others needing this intervention with 
inadequate incentives to police.116 
This ex ante regulatory approach is possible because regula-
tors generally have sufficient information to identify—and es-
tablish standards that would allow firms to identify—situations 
in which asset insufficiency is a concern ex ante. For example, 
they can target firms with a small amount of net assets, firms 
 
 115 We thus agree with Professors Vikramaditya Khanna and Timothy Dickinson 
that, in order to deter corporate crime, enforcement authorities should supplement 
harm-contingent sanctions with non-harm-contingent sanctions when firms are asset 
constrained. But we conclude that PDA mandates are not the optimal form of supple-
mentary liability. For an alternate conclusion, see Khanna and Dickinson, 105 Mich L 
Rev at 1727–31 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that asset insufficiency would justify requir-
ing corporate monitoring, which is one type of harm-contingent duty and sanction). 
 116 Non-harm-contingent liability is effective only when government authorities in-
cur sufficient monitoring and enforcement expenditures to detect and sanction breaches 
of policing duties. Thus, non-harm-contingent liability is optimal only when the expected 
social cost of policing plus government monitoring is less than the social cost of the 
crimes deterred. We focus on crimes for which this condition is met. As applied to these 
crimes, it might appear that PDAs are superior to ex ante regulation because they apply 
to fewer firms, thus reducing monitoring and enforcement. Yet this is not necessarily the 
case for two reasons. First, total social costs may be higher under PDAs because PDAs 
deter fewer crimes, because they are not imposed until wrongdoing is detected. Second, 
to induce optimal policing through PDAs, the government would likely need to incur 
higher per-firm monitoring costs in order to yield the same expected sanction as can be 
imposed through regulation, because PDAs tend to be imposed on firms whose assets 
have already been reduced by fines imposed for the detected crime. 
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operating in an industry in which optimal compliance expendi-
tures are high relative to assets, or firms conducting operations 
that generate a small probability of very costly harm.117 To the 
extent that any additional duty, or any additional enforcement 
mechanism, is optimal to address asset insufficiency, this duty 
should be imposed, or the enforcement mechanism should be 
implemented, through ex ante regulation or regulatory enforce-
ment policy that addresses this problem generally, rather than 
through PDAs that can apply only to the narrow subset of firms 
that happen to have engaged in prior wrongdoing. 
Even to the extent that firms with asset insufficiency cannot 
be identified through clear ex ante rules, we see no room for 
PDA mandates. In cases involving high policing agency costs, 
the argument for PDA mandates is based on the prosecutors’ 
ability to obtain information about the extent of these costs in 
the course of, and as a by-product of, their investigation of the 
substantive crime. Assessing the severity of policing agency 
costs requires a case-by-case analysis. Prosecutors are likely to 
have a comparative advantage over regulators in conducting this 
analysis, given that they are already investigating the substan-
tive crime. But we see no equivalent comparative advantage 
with respect to asset insufficiency. Unlike the type of soft infor-
mation that may affect the assessment of policing agency costs, 
asset insufficiency is determined by hard factors—with the ul-
timate question being whether the company’s balance sheet is 
strong enough to pay the liability the firm may face if it commits 
a wrong. Any relevant information learned by prosecutors could 
be easily obtained by regulators, who, due to their financial and 
industry expertise, should be superior to prosecutors in their 
ability to make a determination of asset insufficiency based on 
this information. 
Asset insufficiency thus resembles policing agency costs in 
one important respect: the possibility that corporate criminal 
sanctions do not provide adequate incentives for managers justi-
fies additional interventions. But asset insufficiency differs from 
 
 117 Regulators can obtain firm-specific information through publicly available finan-
cial statements or through regulatory examinations. Regulators may also be able to 
adopt regulations targeted at industries in which firms tend to be asset constrained, as 
can occur with firms in industries with high expected liability to third parties. See James 
B. Rebitzer, Job Safety and Contract Workers in the Petrochemical Industry, 34 Indust 
Relations 40, 45–47 (1995) (finding that, even though petrochemical safety training and 
supervision is more effective in-house, petrochemical firms tend to outsource safety train-
ing and supervision to smaller outside contractors in order to reduce expected liability). 
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policing agency costs in the two other important respects: the 
ability to identify the firms that should be subject to additional 
duties ex ante and the absence of a reason to expect that prose-
cutors have a comparative advantage over regulators in identify-
ing such firms on a case-by-case basis. 
C. Targeted Heightened Duties 
In the course, and as a by-product, of their investigations, 
prosecutors may obtain information that indicates that a firm 
should be subject to heightened duties relative to those generally 
imposed ex ante. As we have argued in Section A, information 
that prosecutors obtain about policing agency costs at a specific 
firm may justify the imposition of PDA mandates on such a firm 
to address those policing agency cost problems. This raises the 
question: Are prosecutors similarly justified in using PDAs to 
impose heightened duties when they obtain other information 
suggesting that additional duties are needed for reasons other 
than policing agency costs? The answer, in brief, is no. 
To be sure, optimal policing duties are likely to vary among 
firms. For example, the optimal compliance program to deter vi-
olations of the FCPA should differ between firms doing business 
in countries with low levels of corruption, such as Sweden, and 
those doing business in countries with high levels of corruption, 
such as Uzbekistan.118 PDAs enable prosecutors to impose man-
dates that can vary across firms in response to their different 
circumstances. But this aspect of PDA mandates does not justify 
prosecutors imposing mandates on firms ex post. Generally, the 
best response to the variation in optimal duties is to vary the po-
licing duties imposed on firms ex ante, so that heightened polic-
ing duties are imposed on all firms that need them.119 This can 
be accomplished through heightened ex ante duties imposed 
through either harm-contingent corporate liability or regulation. 
Ex ante duties are clearly superior when both the corporate 
characteristics warranting special or enhanced policing and the 
optimal policing responses to these characteristics can be identi-
fied based on criteria that are observable ex ante. In this situation, 
 
 118 Sweden received a (good) score of 9.2 for perceived corruption in 2010, while  
Uzbekistan received a (bad) score of 1.6. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 *10–11 
(Transparency International 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/L7B6-R5MB. 
 119 Indeed, when properly applied, the duty of an “effective” or “reasonable” compli-
ance program recognizes that successful compliance programs must balance a variety of 
factors, including the inherent risk of wrongdoing. 
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enforcement authorities can induce optimal policing by imposing 
the heightened duty ex ante on all firms with a particular char-
acteristic. This is preferable to using PDAs, which can impose 
enhanced duties on only a small subset of the firms requiring 
enhanced policing—those with prior detected wrongdoing. 
But ex ante duties may also be preferable to PDA mandates 
when regulators and prosecutors cannot, ex ante, identify which 
firms should be subject to heightened duties through clear rules. 
Ex ante duties are likely superior as long as regulators can both 
identify the type of firms requiring heightened duties and estab-
lish standards that would enable firms to determine ex ante 
which heightened duties they are subject to. Enforcement au-
thorities can then determine ex post whether firms were subject 
to and breached heightened duties. As long as the firm’s policing 
is designed to maximize profits (and the duty and sanctions are 
set at proper levels)—that is, the firm is not subject to signifi-
cant policing agency costs—authorities can provide proper in-
centives through such ex ante duties. 
Ex ante regulation can be employed effectively to address 
circumstances warranting heightened policing, other than polic-
ing agency costs, by using firm-level liability to ensure that 
firms are better off if they comply with their enhanced duties. 
Absent policing agency costs, corporate liability can induce 
managers to ensure that the firm complies with its heightened 
duties. It is in this crucial respect that policing agency costs dif-
fer from other aspects of a firm that potentially support height-
ened policing duties. In the presence of policing agency costs, ex 
post sanctions imposed on the firm will not induce the firm to 
assess the likely scope of its duties and police accordingly, be-
cause managers are not seeking to undertake the policing that 
maximizes firm profits. 
D. PDA Mandates as Second Best 
Our analysis so far of when PDAs are justified has assumed 
that firms would alternatively be subject to proper duty-based 
corporate liability. But corporate liability may not be structured 
optimally. Government authorities may fail to establish optimal 
ex ante policing duties or to impose optimal sanctions due to in-
terest group capture, inertia, political gridlock, or time and  
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resource constraints.120 A prosecutor may thus encounter situa-
tions in which she feels that the existing liability regime is not 
sufficient to induce optimal policing. The prosecutor may agree 
that the best way to address these problems would be to reform 
the existing ex ante duties and sanctions. But she may conclude 
that this is unlikely to happen, at least in the short run. This 
presents the question: Should an individual prosecutor try to 
remedy this situation by using PDAs to impose policing and 
metapolicing mandates on select firms with prior detected 
wrongdoing when the prosecutor has the power to do so? Our 
answer, again, is no. 
First, individual prosecutors who conclude that incentives to 
adopt proper policing are insufficient may be wrong in either 
their assessment that the existing regime requires reform or 
their choice of what mandates to impose. Prosecutors’ expertise 
lies in detecting and sanctioning specific wrongdoing. Yet indi-
vidual prosecutors are unlikely to have the expertise needed to 
substitute their judgment for that of Congress, regulators, and 
other authorities acting ex ante regarding the appropriate polic-
ing duties and sanctions to impose across an entire set of firms. 
Unlike Congress, regulators, and other authorities acting ex 
ante, individual prosecutors tend to lack industry-specific exper-
tise, the staff needed to engage in studies or fact-finding, and 
the systematic input from firms subject to policing duties or 
from potential victims of wrongdoing. The probability of error by 
individual prosecutors is heightened when the regime they are 
trying to adopt could have easily been put in place by Congress, 
regulatory agencies, or other authorities who have the requisite 
expertise. These bodies—explicitly or implicitly—decided not to 
adopt the regime that the prosecutor would prefer, raising the 
possibility that these groups, deciding with the benefit of expert 
advice, correctly concluded the mandates should not generally be 
imposed.121 Thus, while authorities with rulemaking power to 
 
 120 See generally Arlen, 66 U Miami L Rev 321 (cited in note 19) (critiquing the Or-
ganizational Sentencing Guidelines). For a discussion of Congress’s apparent use of in-
tentional underfunding—through a failure to appropriate funds—to undermine the effec-
tiveness of the corporate enforcement laws that it has adopted, see Daniel C. Richman, 
Corporate Headhunting, 8 Harv L & Pol Rev 265, 273–75 (2014). 
 121 In the case of policing agency costs, the imposition of mandates by prosecutors 
rests not on other authorities having adopted an inadequate regime but on prosecutors’ 
special ability to identify firms with significant policing agency costs. Thus, the argu-
ment that prosecutors should defer to other bodies with greater expertise does not ap-
ply with equal force to mandates intended to address policing agency costs. The general 
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act ex ante may err, individual prosecutors attempting to ad-
dress their deficiencies are even more likely to err when they 
override the judgment of these authorities. 
Prosecutors also may err because they pursue either the 
wrong social goal or their own private aims. Prosecutors are 
trained to think about what is needed to make sure crime does 
not happen. But this is not, and should not be, the standard em-
ployed to establish “effective” or “reasonable” compliance. Com-
pliance is costly.122 Optimal compliance policy thus involves 
trade-offs between the goals of deterring wrongdoing and of not 
burdening the firm with excessive costs.123 Prosecutors have ex-
pertise in only one side of this trade-off. Given their institutional 
bias, they are likely to overweight the benefits of crime reduc-
tion while giving insufficient weight to the costs of compliance. 
In addition, some prosecutors may be tempted to impose 
mandates to serve their own aims, not social aims. Prosecutors 
may agree to reduce the monetary sanctions and substitute a 
general mandate in order to obtain a faster resolution of a high-
profile case, while still appearing tough on crime. This practice 
may serve prosecutors’ personal aims, but it reduces the ex ante 
deterrent effect of duty-based corporate criminal liability if firms 
expect prosecutors to reduce the monetary sanctions imposed for 
their initial breach of policing duties. In addition, prosecutors 
can pursue personal aims when imposing mandates requiring 
the firm to appoint a particular person as either an independent 
 
argument, however, that prosecutors’ limited expertise results in a significant possibility 
of prosecutors adopting inefficient mandates does apply. 
 122 For example, in 2014 HSBC reported that it was spending $750 million to $800 
million per year on its compliance and risk program. Martin Arnold, HSBC Wrestles with 
Soaring Costs of Compliance (Fin Times, Aug 4, 2014), online at http:// 
www.ft.com/content/0e3f0760-1bef-11e4-9666-00144feabdc0 (visited Jan 10, 2017) (Per-
ma archive unavailable). 
 123 These costs can include both the direct costs of compliance and the indirect effect 
of compliance on the firm’s internal operations. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic 
Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in Jennifer Arlen, ed, Research Handbook on 
Corporate Crime and Financial Misdealing *3–4 (forthcoming 2017). 
 374  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:323 
   
director or an outside monitor,124 because a prosecutor has a sig-
nificant say in the identity of these individuals.125 
To be sure, the risk of error by prosecutors and the risk that 
prosecutors may pursue the wrong social goal or their own pri-
vate aims are also present with PDA mandates imposed on firms 
believed to suffer from policing agency costs. However, the con-
text of policing agency costs differs from other contexts in two 
respects that may justify the use of PDAs despite these risks. 
First, prosecutors enjoy a comparative advantage over regula-
tors in identifying specific firms requiring additional regulation 
because of policing agency costs. Second, prosecutors imposing 
mandates to address policing agency costs are less likely to be 
overriding an ex ante informed decision by regulators that man-
dates are not necessary. Because regulators cannot easily identify 
firms with policing agency costs, their failure to impose ex ante 
duties that are justified by policing agency costs does not 
amount to an implicit rejection of the need for these heightened 
duties for firms identified as suffering from policing agency 
costs. As a result, as we have argued in Part III.A, PDA man-
dates that are properly designed can be superior to ex ante regu-
lations in addressing policing agency costs. Even taking into ac-
count the risk that prosecutors get it wrong (as compared to the 
risk that legislators or regulators get it wrong), properly imple-
mented PDA mandates can be a desirable component of the lia-
bility regime in the context of policing agency costs. 
Outside the context of policing agency costs, however, we do 
not see a basis for concluding either that individual prosecutors, 
as a rule, are superior at devising duties and sanctions or that 
an individual prosecutor can identify the specific circumstances 
 
 124 Recognizing the fact that prosecutors may pursue private benefits when deciding 
to impose or select a monitor, the DOJ has increased centralized oversight of both deci-
sions. See Criminal Resource Manual § 163 (DOJ 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6AD8-TEN2; Criminal Resource Manual § 166 (DOJ 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/TFD3-LHCU. This oversight reduces but does not eliminate prosecutors’ 
ability to obtain private benefits from the decision to impose a monitor. 
 125 Even when prosecutors are right that the existing system is inadequate, the so-
cial benefits of prosecutors using firm-specific mandates to address systemic deficiencies 
are likely to be low. First, and most obviously, firm-specific duties created and imposed 
by individual prosecutors do not address the deficient ex ante incentives created by the 
existing system. Instead, they affect only one specific firm with detected wrongdoing and 
only after ex ante incentives have failed. Second, prosecutors’ exercise of individual au-
thority to impose costly heightened policing duties on some firms in an industry may dis-
tort competition in the industry and may decrease social welfare, particularly when all 
firms should be subject to the duty. General solutions are the superior response to defi-
ciencies of general application. 
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in which she is superior. These considerations suggest that indi-
vidual prosecutors should not design firm-specific duties to rem-
edy general problems best addressed through a general solution, 
such as ex ante regulation. 
E. Summary 
Prosecutors are justified in imposing PDA mandates, but 
only to address one particular situation: when the firm failed to 
police properly because its managers or the board obtained pri-
vate benefits from deficient policing. In such circumstances, it 
may be desirable to impose highly specific compliance duties or 
metapolicing duties through PDA mandates. Otherwise, Con-
gress, regulators, and other authorities should address policing 
deficiencies through appropriate, generally applicable policing 
duties imposed ex ante. 
IV.  OPTIMAL AND ACTUAL ENFORCEMENT POLICY GOVERNING 
MANDATES 
In the preceding Part, we concluded that PDA mandates 
should be used to supplement duty-based corporate criminal lia-
bility only when firms are plagued by significant policing agency 
costs and then only when the mandates are superior to ex ante 
regulation and likely to reduce policing agency costs in an effi-
cient manner. This conclusion has implications for federal en-
forcement policy. It helps to identify the type of firms that are 
appropriately subject to mandates and the appropriate structure 
of these mandates. 
A. When Should Mandates Be Imposed? Optimal versus Actual 
Policy 
PDA mandates should be imposed only if two conditions are 
met. First, the firm with detected wrongdoing must have had a 
policing deficiency prior to the PDA attributable to policing 
agency costs. Second, the firm must be likely to be plagued by 
policing agency costs in the future absent intervention. In this 
Section, we evaluate existing Criminal Division policy and fed-
eral practice and show that the current approach to mandates is 
not justified. 
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1. Mandates are not justified solely by inadequate 
compliance. 
Existing DOJ policy and practice encourages prosecutors to 
impose compliance mandates whenever the firm did not have an 
effective compliance program at the time of the wrongdoing.126 
This is too broad. Evidence of deficient policing is not sufficient, 
on its own, to infer that a firm was plagued by policing agency 
costs—the only circumstance in which a PDA mandate is justified. 
First, any policing deficiencies identified by prosecutors may 
have been due to managers erring in determining the required 
level of compliance or the level of compliance the firm is actually 
undertaking. While the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
and federal enforcement policy in effect impose an ex ante duty 
on all firms to adopt an effective compliance system, this duty 
takes the form of general standards that leave considerable 
room for interpretation.127 Directors or managers of firms with 
deficient compliance programs may have believed in good faith 
that their firm complied with the requisite policing standard, only 
to find out later that the firm did not. This is particularly likely 
when the firm’s approach to compliance resembled that of other 
firms in the industry and the relevant regulatory authority nev-
er expressed disapproval of the standard approach. Alternatively, 
the firm may have underinvested in compliance because the ex-
isting regime does not provide firms with adequate incentives to 
adopt an effective compliance program. This can occur, even 
with large fines, if the additional compliance expenditures ex-
ceed the sanction discounted by the probability that a sanction 
will be imposed (which requires, for harm-contingent liability, 
that a substantive violation occurs and is detected).128 It may also 
occur, paradoxically, if compliance enhances the risk that 
wrongdoing is detected and the sanction for committing a sub-
stantive violation, even if the company has taken compliance 
measures, is too high.129 These problems are best rectified by 
measures such as clarification of the requisite policing standards 
 
 126 See notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 127 See note 97. 
 128 See notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 129 See Arlen, 23 J Legal Stud at 842–43 (cited in note 10). Specifically, firms will 
not undertake effective compliance if the expected sanction if the firm does undertake 
effective compliance—which is the fine discounted by the probability of sanction when 
compliance is effective—plus the added cost of compliance exceeds the expected sanction 
if it does not. 
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or an increase (or decrease) in sanctions determined by the 
proper regulatory authorities on an ex ante basis (or, in the case 
of good-faith mistakes, may best be left alone), rather than by ex 
post mandates devised by prosecutors. 
Thus, the current federal policy and practice should be re-
placed with one favoring mandates only when a firm with de-
tected wrongdoing had policing deficiencies that were attributa-
ble to substantial policing agency costs that are likely to 
continue absent intervention. 
2. When mandates are inappropriate. 
As previously discussed, the specific attributes of a firm that 
generate policing agency costs are hard to identify ex ante. 
Thus, individual prosecutors inevitably must be given some dis-
cretion to determine, based on the information they have ob-
tained in the course of their investigation, whether policing 
agency costs were present at the time of the crime and are likely 
to continue in the future. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify circumstances in 
which mandates are unlikely to be necessary. In these circum-
stances, prosecutors should generally not impose mandates, and 
the DOJ should instruct them accordingly. We discuss three 
such circumstances. 
a) Controlling shareholders.  Mandates generally should 
not be imposed if an individual or a privately held corporate 
shareholder owns a stake in the firm that is sufficiently large to 
enable them to control the board (that is, if they are a control-
ling shareholder). Controlling shareholders generally have the 
incentives and the authority to ensure that the firm adopts the 
policing measures, including appropriate metapolicing 
measures, that serve shareholders’ interests. Enforcement au-
thorities thus can induce the desired corporate policing through 
duty-based liability enforced by adequate monetary sanctions 
imposed on the firm.130 
To be sure, even firms with controlling shareholders may 
commit corporate crimes and engage in inadequate policing. In 
these firms, however, policing is likely to be inadequate for rea-
sons other than policing agency costs. Potential reasons include 
 
 130 See James B. Jacobs and Ronald Goldstock, Monitors & IPSIGS: Emergence of a 
New Criminal Justice Role, 43 Crim L Bull 217, 235, 237 (Spring 2007) (discussing the 
rise of private monitors that firms can hire voluntarily to enhance compliance, which can 
improve the corporation’s image with shareholders and regulators). 
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insufficient corporate financial incentives to undertake effective 
policing,131 insufficient information about effective policing, and 
asset insufficiency.132 These problems should be addressed 
through a combination of information and appropriate corporate 
and individual liability structured to ensure that the firm is bet-
ter off ex ante if it adopts optimal policing. PDA mandates are 
neither an optimal substitute nor a proper complement to this 
regime in this situation. 
Thus, for example, we are skeptical whether the PDA man-
dates imposed on Exactech, Inc, are justified.133 It is unlikely 
that the firm’s failure to adequately police to prevent salesmen 
from paying kickbacks to surgeons in order to enhance sales of 
the firm’s products was attributable to policing agency costs. Dr. 
William Petty and Betty Petty, Exactech’s founders, owned 29.2 
percent and also had operational control of the firm. William 
was chairman of the board and chief executive officer. Betty was 
vice president of administration and corporate secretary. Their 
son, David, was president and a director of the firm.134 With 
 
 131 See Arlen, 66 U Miami L Rev at 336–40 (cited in note 19) (showing that the Or-
ganizational Sentencing Guidelines do not provide large firms with adequate incentives 
to self-report or adopt expensive compliance programs). 
 132 See Part III.B. Policing may also be inadequate if the controlling shareholder di-
rectly commits and benefits from the crime, which is a form of policing agency costs. 
Such situations are best addressed through personal liability on the controlling share-
holder for the underlying crime. 
 133 See generally Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v Exactech, Inc, 
CR No 10-837 (D NJ filed Dec 7, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/6K39-2CFY. 
 134 Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders to Be Held on May 3, 2012 *4, 7–8  
(Exactech, Inc, Mar 23, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/2AEL-J8AY. One of the most 
famous recent cases involving a firm with a controlling shareholder is the pending FCPA 
case against Wal-Mart. According to The New York Times, employees of Wal-Mart’s Mex-
ican subsidiary paid bribes to Mexican government officials to speed store expansions in 
violation of the FCPA. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-
Mart after Top-Level Struggle (NY Times, Apr 21, 2012), online at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html (visited Jan 
10, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) The CEO apparently responded to concerns raised 
internally by delegating the investigation to the firm’s Mexican subsidiary, notwith-
standing concerns that the subsidiary would not conduct an independent investigation. 
Aruna Viswanatha and Devlin Barrett, Wal-Mart Bribery Probe Finds Few Signs of Ma-
jor Misconduct in Mexico (Wall St J, Oct 19, 2015), online at http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/wal-mart-bribery-probe-finds-little-misconduct-in-mexico-1445215737 (visited Oct 
26, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable). This delegation arguably is evidence of deficient 
policing. Evidence of widespread bribery in India uncovered by the DOJ’s investigation 
also suggests policing deficiencies in that division of the company. Id. Yet these policing 
deficiencies are unlikely to be attributable to policing agency costs. The Walton family 
controls about 50 percent of the company’s stock and has family members on the board 
involved in management. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, Schedule 14A: Proxy Statement pur-
suant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 *15–24 (SEC, Apr 20, 2016), 
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these ownership stakes, adequate monetary sanctions imposed 
on the firm for deficient policing should provide sufficient incen-
tives for the Petty family to ensure that Exactech undertakes 
the required policing measures. 
b) Corporate self-reporting.  PDA mandates are question-
able when top managers proactively responded to suspected 
wrongdoing by taking reasonable and good-faith measures to in-
vestigate the wrongdoing, report it to the enforcement authori-
ties, and cooperate in their investigation. These actions suggest 
that top managers do not have the hear-no-evil, see-no-evil atti-
tude that is the hallmark of policing agency costs. 
To be sure, even if the firm and its managers investigated, 
self-reported, and cooperated, policing agency costs could con-
ceivably affect other elements of corporate policing, such as the 
firm’s compliance program. Conceivably, managers investigated, 
self-reported, and cooperated only because the evidence of 
wrongdoing was staring them in the face but would have been 
happier if the compliance program had never uncovered such 
evidence. 
However, if the company acted reasonably and in good faith 
once evidence of wrongdoing emerged, it is likely that any defi-
ciency in ex ante compliance is not attributable to policing agency 
costs. Management, for example, may have instituted a deficient 
compliance program because they concluded in good faith either 
that the compliance program was effective135 or that the cost of 
effective compliance to the firm exceeded its benefit given ex-
pected sanctions. Both of these problems are better addressed 
through clearer ex ante compliance duties and adequate mone-
tary sanctions for breach. 
The DOJ, at present, does not treat prompt and full corpo-
rate self-reporting as a consideration that weighs against most 
mandates. The Criminal Division has informed prosecutors that 
one type of mandate, requiring a monitor, is likely inappropriate 
 
archived at http://perma.cc/QW57-XMPZ (listing the members of Wal-Mart’s Board of 
Directors). Indeed, there is reason to believe that a family member was aware of the con-
duct. Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up (cited in note 134). Instead of PDA 
mandates, prosecutors should impose sufficient corporate (and potentially individual) 
liability to demonstrate to the Walton family that Wal-Mart will be healthier financially 
if it adopts a proper compliance program and acts promptly to deter bribery than if it 
does not. 
 135 This is particularly likely in firms with isolated wrongdoing—suggesting that the 
compliance program may in fact be effective. 
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if the firm self-reported.136 But it has not reached a similar con-
clusion for other mandates, such as compliance program man-
dates.137 As a result, prosecutors impose compliance mandates 
and other mandates on firms that self-reported and fully cooper-
ated. We question this practice. 
Accordingly, we are skeptical whether certain mandates im-
posed on Johnson & Johnson (J&J) for FCPA violations by its 
subsidiaries were justified.138 In that case, prosecutors deter-
mined that the firm engaged in voluntary and timely self-
reporting and fully cooperated. Yet prosecutors still imposed  
extensive mandates, requiring, among other measures, the ap-
pointment of a chief compliance officer with significant FCPA 
experience who reports directly to the audit committee of the 
board, the identification of at least five operating companies that 
are at high risk for corruption, FCPA audits of these companies 
at least once every three years, and thorough FCPA diligence of 
all sales intermediaries as well as of any firm J&J plans to ac-
quire.139 Given management’s response to the wrongdoing once it 
 
 136 FCPA Resource Guide at *71 (cited in note 59) (“[C]ompanies are sometimes al-
lowed to engage in self-monitoring, typically in cases when the company has made a vol-
untary disclosure, has been fully cooperative, and has demonstrated a genuine commit-
ment to reform.”). 
 137 USAM § 9-28.800 (cited in note 6) (listing the timeliness of a corporation’s volun-
tary disclosure of wrongdoing as one factor to be considered when determining whether a 
company’s compliance program is adequate); USAM § 9-28.900 (cited in note 6) (discuss-
ing how the fact that a company self-reported should be considered when a prosecutor is 
deciding to prosecute but stating that it is only one factor in the analysis). 
 138 See generally Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Johnson & Johnson (DOJ, Crim-
inal Division, Fraud Section, Jan 14, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/7NAC-2T6R 
(“J&J DPA”). The J&J DPA states that the firm reported “the majority” of the miscon-
duct. Id § 4(a) at *2. The mandates could arguably be justified if prosecutors found that 
as a result of policing agency costs managers knowingly failed to report all the miscon-
duct they detected and that the omitted misconduct was material. The PDA on ABB Ltd 
also imposed compliance mandates on a firm that self-reported. Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, United States v ABB Ltd, CR No 10-665, § 4 at *4–5 (SD Tex filed Sept 29, 
2010), archived at http://perma.cc/JBP8-L7E8. Other PDAs impose monitors on firms 
that self-reported. 
 139 J&J DPA Attachment D §§ 1(a), 6–7, 9 at *33–36 (cited in note 138). J&J’s is not 
the only PDA that imposed mandates on a firm while describing it as having self-
reported the wrong. Many PDAs imposing mandates on firms that self-reported involve 
foreign bribery. See, for example, Monsanto DPA §§ 1, 12 at *1, 9 (cited in note 46); 
Nonprosecution Agreement, RAE Systems Inc, *1 (USAO ND Cal, Dec 10, 2010), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/PES2-XGP5 (“RAE NPA”). It is possible that some of these 
firms had high policing agency costs and undertook incomplete or delayed self-reporting. 
Yet a number of these cases imposed a mandate on the firm or its controlled subsidiary 
even though the firm self-reported and the wrongdoing occurred only in a single country 
or was otherwise isolated. See, for example, J&J DPA § 2 at *1 (cited in note 138) (noting 
that the pending charges were against only one subsidiary of J&J); Monsanto DPA 
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was detected, these PDA mandates are not warranted based on 
the information available from the PDA. 
c) Firms with new ownership and management.  PDA 
mandates are not justified unless prosecutors detect policing 
agency costs that are likely to affect the firm’s future policing ef-
forts. It is generally reasonable to assume that firms that had 
deficient policing in the past as a result of policing agency costs 
will continue to be plagued by policing agency costs in the fu-
ture. But this presumption does not hold for a firm that under-
went a transformation following the violation that directly af-
fected its policing agency costs. Thus, when the firm was 
acquired by another firm, there is usually less reason to believe 
that preacquisition policing agency costs will persist postacquisi-
tion. Lesser changes, such as replacement of top management or 
significant changes in compensation policy, may also ameliorate 
the firm’s policing agency costs, depending on the source of the 
original problem. For example, if a firm’s policing agency costs 
were attributable to a CEO who was particularly averse to inter-
ference by the compliance department, a replacement of the 
CEO may substantially reduce policing agency costs.140 In these 
 
Appx A at *1–5 (cited in note 46) (describing the actions that gave rise to the charges 
against Monsanto, most of which were limited to Monsanto’s activities in Indonesia); 
RAE NPA Appx A at *1–10 (cited in note 139) (detailing the FCPA violations, which 
were limited to the company’s activities in China). Isolated wrongdoing would appear to 
be consistent with the firm having an effective compliance program that failed in one 
area. It is hard to see the justification for imposing a mandate instead of (or in addition 
to) enhanced sanctions on firms that self-report isolated wrongdoing. 
Indeed, in some cases prosecutors even imposed a monitor on a firm that self-
reported a violation. For example, the prosecutors negotiating with Smith & Nephew 
concluded that the firm voluntarily self-reported the wrong prior to imminent threat of 
detection and fully cooperated. The firm also voluntarily reformed its compliance pro-
gram. Nevertheless, the DPA required the firm to accept and pay for a corporate moni-
tor. It also imposed compliance program mandates. Smith & Nephew DPA §§ 3, 8 at *2, 6 
(cited in note 60). This mandate is striking because the USAM specifically notes that 
monitors generally are not appropriate for firms that self-reported. 
 140 In some cases, the agency costs may arise entirely from the interpersonal dynamic 
among a small constellation of replaceable managers and directors. When this is true, 
the firm may be able to eliminate the problem by replacing these individuals with out-
siders. Past analyses of PDAs reveal that many firms with detected wrongdoing replace 
management, and firms with detected wrongdoing that implicates contracting parties 
often hire outsiders to replace existing managers, doubtlessly to signal that the firm has 
turned over a new leaf. See Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Pen-
alty for Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42 J L & Econ 489, 514–16 (1999). See also Arlen, 
Corporate Criminal Liability at 149–51 (cited in note 23) (discussing the factors influenc-
ing the reputational penalty for corporate crime). These firms, going forward, may not be 
subject to the level of policing agency costs that caused the initial breach, and thus in-
tervention may not be needed. 
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situations, past defects on their own are unlikely to justify PDA 
mandates. 
Accordingly, we are skeptical whether the PDA mandates 
imposed on Massey Energy Company following an explosion at 
one of its coal mines were justified.141 Massey was acquired by 
Alpha Natural Resources after the accident and before the PDA 
was imposed.142 In addition, Massey’s CEO and president had 
left the company, and the Massey officer who replaced him as 
CEO was going to have only an advisory role after the merger.143 
Thus, even if prosecutors had evidence that the deficient polic-
ing prior to the accident was due to policing agency costs, this 
would not establish that the firm was plagued by policing agency 
costs following the acquisition. The PDA mandate imposed on 
Massey would be justified only if prosecutors had evidence that 
Alpha suffered from significant policing agency costs.144 How-
ever, it is unlikely that the prosecutors had obtained significant 
information about Alpha in their investigations of events that 
largely, if not entirely, preceded Massey’s acquisition by Alpha. 
  
 
 141 The policing mandates included provisions governing the frequency of safety 
compliance visits at each underground mine, the information to be collected during these 
visits, and internal and external reporting requirements following those visits, in addi-
tion to multiple other requirements. Alpha NPA § 5(g) at *3 (cited in note 40). Prevention 
mandates included a mandate to spend at least $80 million on safety remedial measures 
in the two years following the agreement and to undertake specific safety measures, in-
cluding “launch[ing] a new state-of-the-art safety training facility in the Julian, West 
Virginia area” that includes lab space of approximately 96,000 square feet and purchasing 
specific amounts of monitoring equipment and mine escape equipment. Id § 5 at *2–3. 
 142 Mario Parker and Zachary R. Mider, Alpha Natural Agrees to Buy Massey Energy 
for $7.1 Billion (Bloomberg, Jan 29, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/9L9Z-5WP2. The 
NPA was signed December 6, 2011. See Alpha NPA § 1 at *1 (cited in note 40). 
 143 Parker and Mider, Alpha Natural Agrees to Buy Massey Energy for $7.1 Billion 
(cited in note 142). 
 144 Prosecutors may have imposed policing mandates, instead of imposing enhanced 
monetary sanctions for Massey’s policing breaches, because Alpha did not commit those 
breaches. The DOJ should adopt a policy against this because it allows firms with de-
tected wrongdoing to insulate shareholders by simply selling the firm. Alpha would have 
paid less for Massey—to Massey’s managers’ and shareholders’ detriment—if it was con-
fident it would have to pay large, predictable monetary sanctions for Massey’s crime and 
policing failures. Moreover, the PDA policing mandates are not the only questionable 
feature of this PDA, which also requires Alpha to contribute $48 million to a trust to be 
used to fund research and development on mine health and safety by nonprofits and ac-
ademic institutions. Alpha NPA § 6 at *4 (cited in note 40). 
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B. What Type of Mandates? 
The policing agency cost justification for PDA mandates also 
places limitations on the type of mandates that should be im-
posed. Mandates should be designed to induce optimal policing 
by a firm burdened by policing agency costs. This goal has sev-
eral implications. 
First, mandates should address the underlying problem: the 
presence of significant policing agency costs. As discussed above, 
mandates can do so in two ways: by imposing specific policing 
duties or by imposing metapolicing duties that shift authority or 
oversight over policing to persons inside or outside the firm who 
are not subject to significant policing agency costs. Mandates 
that contain neither of these measures are likely to be ineffec-
tive in addressing policing agency costs. Thus, we would not re-
gard PDA mandates that require the firm merely to adopt a 
compliance program that satisfies the Organizational Sentenc-
ing Guidelines as justified. Such mandates are not sufficiently 
specific as to what policing duties a firm must undertake, nor do 
they provide for effective metapolicing. Similarly, PDAs that 
impose general policing duties supplemented by no more than a 
duty to make an annual self-report to prosecutors are suspect. 
Prosecutors receiving nothing more than an annual report pre-
pared by the firm are often unlikely to provide effective oversight 
over compliance because they do not have sufficient industry ex-
pertise, time, or incentives to determine whether the firm has in 
fact adopted and is implementing an effective policing regime.145 
Second, PDA mandates should generally be targeted at re-
ducing policing agency costs, rather than at improving corporate 
governance more generally. PDA mandates create an inevitable 
risk that prosecutors will err when imposing internal reforms. 
The risk of error is lower, and may be worth incurring, when 
mandates relate directly to policing measures. After all, prosecu-
tors have some general enforcement and firm-specific expertise 
that should enable them to identify both the policing deficiencies 
that exist within a firm and the policing and metapolicing man-
dates that could address the agency costs that led to the defi-
cient policing. By contrast, prosecutors rarely have the requisite 
 
 145 In addition, assistant US attorneys regularly obtain new employment during the 
pendency of a PDA; their replacements have their own cases to attend to and are unlikely 
to actively oversee compliance with past PDAs. See Richard T. Boylan and Cheryl X. 
Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J L & 
Econ 627, 643–44 (2005). 
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information or expertise to identify desirable corporate govern-
ance reforms more generally.146 
These considerations lead us to be skeptical that a free-
standing, PDA-imposed mandate to separate the chairman of 
the board and the CEO is justified.147 Corporate governance ex-
perts do not agree on whether and when it is desirable to sepa-
rate these positions.148 In addition, institutional shareholders 
can readily determine whether a firm has adopted this reform 
and exert substantial pressure on boards to separate these posi-
tions when they deem it important to do so.149 Finally, the bene-
fits from such a separation in reducing policing agency costs of-
ten will be incidental relative to the more fundamental impact 
on overall corporate governance. Nevertheless, in the right cir-
cumstances, a PDA-imposed mandate to separate the chairman 
of the board and the CEO that is coupled with provisions shift-
ing responsibility for corporate policing to the chairman is justi-
fied. Such a mandate would assure that a corporate officer who 
is not subordinate to the CEO has responsibility for policing and 
would be targeted to the possibility that policing agency costs af-
flict the CEO. 
 
 146 Indeed, experts in corporate governance do not agree on what corporate govern-
ance reforms are optimal. See generally, for example, Roberta Romano, Quack Corporate 
Governance, 28 Reg 36 (Winter 2005–2006) (finding that empirical evidence does not 
support many of the governance reforms that have been mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley). 
See also Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton, and Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of 
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 Colum L Rev 1803, 1826–58 (2008) (finding that lead-
ing indices of good corporate governance are not good predictors of performance). 
 147 See, for example, BMS DPA § 8 at *3 (cited in note 47). Similarly, our analysis 
calls into question the mandate imposed on Friedman’s, Inc, requiring it to have both a 
nominations committee and a compensation committee, without any evidence that the 
deficient policing was tied to policing agency costs arising from a compensation structure 
that these committees would alleviate. See Nonprosecution Agreement, Friedman’s, Inc, 
§ 8(C)–(D) at *11–12 (USAO EDNY, Nov 29, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/2UTV-BSNA. 
 148 For example, Professor Roberta Romano concluded that reviews of research on 
the economic impact of splitting the CEO and board chair roles on US companies did not 
find that splitting the two positions has a significant effect on share price or accounting 
income. Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valua-
ble Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 Yale J Reg 174, 192 & n 52 (2001) (describ-
ing the compelling arguments in favor of and against separation). 
 149 Shareholders can, and often do, file precatory resolutions under Rule 14a-8 to 
separate the CEO and chairman positions. See 17 CFR § 240.14a-8. Firms often imple-
ment resolutions that receive majority shareholder support. See Marcel Kahan and  
Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 Tex L Rev 987, 1011–13 (2010). Nevertheless, not all 
firms with strong institutional shareholders have adopted these measures. 
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C. Summary of Reforms 
Our analysis thus reveals that DOJ policy and prosecutors’ 
enforcement practice should be reformed along three dimen-
sions: first, the general standard for imposing policing man-
dates; second, the criteria that determine when mandates are 
imposed; and third, the type of mandates imposed. 
Most importantly, current DOJ policy encouraging prosecu-
tors to impose policing mandates on any firm with detected 
wrongdoing and a deficient compliance program should be re-
vised. Mandates should be imposed only if the prosecutor has ev-
idence to conclude that the inadequate policing was due to sub-
stantial policing agency costs and that, absent intervention, such 
agency costs will result in inadequate policing in the future. 
In addition, prosecutors should be given guidance on factors 
that generally indicate that policing agency costs either do not 
explain the firm’s past deficiencies or are unlikely to persist in 
the future. These factors include the company having a control-
ling shareholder; the company having taken reasonable, good-
faith steps in investigating, self-reporting, and cooperating with 
prosecutors with respect to the wrongdoing; and the company 
having gone through a postcrime transformation, such as 
through an acquisition of the firm, that affected its policing 
agency costs. 
Moreover, mandates must address the underlying policing 
agency cost problem. To do so, they should consist of specific, de-
tailed policing duties or metapolicing measures. Mandates that 
contain neither of these provisions are likely to be ineffective in 
addressing policing agency costs. Duties that go beyond these 
measures are likely to do little to reduce policing agency costs 
and may be socially costly. 
Finally, given that prosecutors imposing mandates act as 
quasi regulators, it would appear appropriate for the DOJ to ob-
tain, make available, and study data on the mandates imposed, 
and to study firms subject to mandates over time, to determine 
which mandates are most effective. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal prosecutors overseeing corporate criminal enforce-
ment have increasingly stepped out of the courtroom and are 
now making structural corporate reform decisions—decisions 
that are more normally the province of management, Congress, 
or civil regulators. In so doing, prosecutors have transformed 
 386  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:323 
   
their relationship with corporate wrongdoers, assuming the role 
of firm-specific regulators. The mandates they impose can be 
very consequential, for example, altering a firm’s internal gov-
ernance or imposing hundreds of millions of dollars in additional 
compliance costs. 
DOJ policy and practice encourages prosecutors to impose 
PDA mandates on firms with detected wrongdoing and inade-
quate compliance. We find that PDA mandates can be justified. 
Yet our analysis reveals that the DOJ’s broad embrace of PDA 
mandates is not warranted. Generally, proper incentives for 
firms to police wrongdoing should be supplied through harm-
contingent liability or ex ante regulations that impose both up-
front policing duties and adequate monetary sanctions on firms 
that violate their duties. PDA mandates are justified, in our 
view, only when a firm failed to take proper policing measures 
due to policing agency costs. Policing agency costs arise when 
managers derive personal benefits if the firm does not adopt the 
policing measures that maximize the firm’s profits. In the pres-
ence of policing agency costs, penalties imposed on the firm may 
not induce the firm to adopt optimal policing measures. Our 
analysis shows PDA mandates can reduce this problem. 
Our conclusion that mandates are justified by policing agency 
costs limits the type of mandates that should be imposed. In 
particular, we can identify situations in which mandates pre-
sumptively should not be imposed, notwithstanding deficient po-
licing, because it is unlikely that deficient policing is attributa-
ble to policing agency costs that will persist. Thus, PDA 
policing mandates generally are not justified when an individ-
ual or family-owned corporation owns a high stake in the firm; 
when top managers, reasonably and in good faith, investigated 
the wrongdoing, reported it to the enforcement authorities, and 
cooperated in the investigation; and when the firm, after the 
wrongdoing, underwent a transformative change that affected 
its policing agency cost structure. 
In addition, in order to be justified, PDA mandates must be 
designed to effectively address policing agency costs. The only 
justifiable policing mandates, in our assessment, are those that 
impose specific policing duties and those that impose metapolic-
ing duties. PDA mandates that merely restate the vague re-
quirement to adopt a policing program that satisfies the Organi-
zational Sentencing Guidelines or that are directed at improving 
corporate governance more generally, as is the case for some 
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PDA mandates, are not justified. Such mandates are not likely 
to be cost-effective in reducing policing agency costs. 
We thus call on the DOJ to reform its current policy and 
practices to ensure the proper use of mandates. In so doing, we 
disagree with those who suggest that the DOJ should abandon 
PDAs altogether on principle.150 PDA mandates can be desirable 
to address policing agency costs—a problem that often cannot be 
effectively handled by more generally applicable criminal liabil-
ity or regulations—but mandates must be imposed more selec-
tively than they presently are and must be structured to address 
these costs. 
 
 150 See Uhlmann, 72 Md L Rev at 1331–44 (cited in note 9). 
